2.07 Specific Intent

• Currency: 2023
• Year: 2023
• Section: Chapter 2 Defining The Crime And Related Matters

2.07 SPECIFIC INTENT

(No General Instruction Recommended.)

Committee Commentary 2.07

(current through March 1, 2023)

The Committee recommends that the district court give no general instruction on specific

intent and that instead, the district court define the mental state required to convict as part of the

instructions defining the elements of the offense. The Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit have

both recognized this as the best approach.

In United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980), the Supreme Court characterized

the distinction between general and specific intent as "ambigu[ous]" and as "the source of a good

deal of confusion." In Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 n.16 (1985), the Court noted

that Devitt and Blackmar Instruction 14.03 on specific intent had been criticized as "too general

and potentially misleading." The Court then said that "[a] more useful instruction might relate

specifically to the mental state required [for the particular offense] and eschew use of difficult

legal concepts like 'specific intent' and 'general intent'."

In United States v. S & Vee Cartage Co., 704 F.2d 914, 918-20 (6th Cir. 1983), the

district court refused to give any general instruction on general and specific intent. Instead, the

court just instructed the jury on the precise mental state required to convict. The Sixth Circuit

rejected the defendants’ argument that an instruction on general and specific intent should have

been given and affirmed the defendants’ convictions. The Sixth Circuit said that "[a] court may

properly instruct the jury about the necessary mens rea without resorting to the words 'specific

intent' or 'general intent'," and that "[i]t is sufficient to define the precise mental state required by

the statute." Id. at 919.

The Sixth Circuit has explained the meaning of specific intent as follows: “In a specific

intent crime, ‘[t]he defendant must act with the purpose of violating the law.’ In a general intent

crime, the defendant need only ‘intend to do the act that the law proscribes.’” United States v.

Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 433 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted).

For some federal crimes, defining the mens rea required to convict will require an

instruction that the government must prove that the defendant intentionally violated a known

legal duty. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991). For other federal crimes,

proof that the defendant knew an act was unlawful is not required to convict. See, e.g., United

States v. S & Vee Cartage Co., supra 704 F.2d at 919.

See also the elements instructions in Chapters 10 et seq.