2.08 Inferring Required Mental State

• Currency: 2023
• Year: 2023
• Section: Chapter 2 Defining The Crime And Related Matters

2.08 INFERRING REQUIRED MENTAL STATE

(1) Next, I want to explain something about proving a defendant's state of mind.

(2) Ordinarily, there is no way that a defendant's state of mind can be proved directly, because no

one can read another person's mind and tell what that person is thinking.

(3) But a defendant's state of mind can be proved indirectly from the surrounding circumstances.

This includes things like what the defendant said, what the defendant did, how the defendant

acted, and any other facts or circumstances in evidence that show what was in the defendant's

mind.

(4) You may also consider the natural and probable results of any acts that the defendant

knowingly did [or did not do], and whether it is reasonable to conclude that the defendant

intended those results. This, of course, is all for you to decide.

Use Note

The bracketed language in paragraph (4) should be used only when there is some

evidence of a potentially probative failure to act.

Committee Commentary 2.08

(current through March 1, 2023)

In United States v. Reeves, 594 F.2d 536, 541 (6th Cir. 1979), the Sixth Circuit

characterized Devitt and Blackmar Instruction 14.13 on proof of intent as a "wholly appropriate

charge," and said that in future cases where such a charge is appropriate, "this Circuit will

approve language similar to [this instruction]." Subsequent Sixth Circuit cases also have

approved this instruction. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 728 F.2d 313, 320-21 (6th Cir.

1984); United States v. Guyon, 717 F.2d 1536, 1539 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Bohlmann,

625 F.2d 751, 752-53 (6th Cir. 1980).

In United States v. Gaines, 594 F.2d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 1979), the court appeared to

question whether any such instruction should be given at all, stating, that "[i]f district judges in

the Sixth Circuit charge at all on inferred intent, it is suggested that they do so in the language of

. . . Devitt and Blackmar 14.13." The Committee believes that some instruction on inferred

intent is appropriate, particularly in cases where the requisite intent is disputed, in order to

provide the jury with some guidance on this subject.

Devitt and Blackmar Instruction 14.13 is quoted below. The brackets indicate deletions

suggested by the Sixth Circuit decisions cited above:

Intent ordinarily may not be proved directly, because there is no

way of fathoming or scrutinizing the operations of the human

mind. But you may infer the defendant's intent from the

surrounding circumstances. You may consider any statement