2.09 Deliberate Ignorance

• Currency: 2023
• Year: 2023
• Section: Chapter 2 Defining The Crime And Related Matters

2.09 DELIBERATE IGNORANCE

(1) Next, I want to explain something about proving a defendant's knowledge.

(2) No one can avoid responsibility for a crime by deliberately ignoring the obvious. If you are

convinced that the defendant deliberately ignored a high probability that _______, then you may

find that he knew _______.

(3) But to find this, you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was

aware of a high probability that _______, and that the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to

what was obvious. Carelessness, or negligence, or foolishness on his part is not the same as

knowledge, and is not enough to convict. This, of course, is all for you to decide.

Use Note

This instruction should be used only when there is some evidence of deliberate

ignorance.

In conspiracy cases, deliberate ignorance can be used to prove (1) the defendant’s

knowledge of the aims or purpose of the conspiracy but not (2) the defendant’s intent to join the

conspiracy.

Committee Commentary 2.09

(current through March 1, 2023)

The Sixth Circuit has approved the language of this instruction. United States v.

Mitchell, 681 F.3d 867, 876 n.51 (6th Cir. 2012) (“We have repeatedly held that [Instruction

2.09] is an accurate statement of the law.”) (footnote and citations omitted). The first case to

approve the instruction was United States v. Lee, 991 F.2d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 1993). The district

judge gave paragraphs (2) and (3) of the instruction with two variations in paragraph (3). First,

the judge omitted the words “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and second, the judge omitted the last

sentence to the effect that the questions were all for the jury to decide. The Sixth Circuit

approved the instruction overall, citing United States v. Lawson, 780 F.2d 535, 542 (6th Cir.

1985) and United States v. Gullett, 713 F.2d 1203, 1212 (6th Cir. 1983). As to the omission of

the phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt,” the court noted that although another instruction on

reasonable doubt was given, and although the defendant did not challenge the omission of the

phrase, “Nonetheless, we wish to express our concern that the judges of the district courts may

invite error if they depart too significantly from the language in the pattern instructions.” Lee,

991 F.2d at 350 n.2.

The next case to address the instruction was Mari v. United States, 47 F.3d 782 (6th Cir.

1995). The district judge used the instruction verbatim, and the Sixth Circuit stated, “We have

specifically approved the language of the instruction, concluding that it is an accurate statement

of the law.” Mari, 47 F.3d 782, 785 (6th Cir. 1995), citing Lee, 991 F.2d at 351. Accord, United

States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 760 n.13 (6th Cir. 2000) (“We have upheld an instruction derived