3-780-348 (1998). JOANNE (BUEHLER) ECKRICH.

• Case Date: November 12, 1998
• Court: Colorado

Colorado Workers Compensation 1998. 3-780-348 (1998). JOANNE (BUEHLER) ECKRICH INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS OFFICEIN THE MATTER OF THE CLAIM OF JOANNE (BUEHLER) ECKRICH, Claimant, v. CITY OF COLORADO SPRINGS, Employer, and SELF-INSURED and/or COLORADO COMPENSATION INSURANCE AUTHORITY, Insurers, Respondents.W. C. No. 3-780-348FINAL ORDER The Colorado Compensation Insurance Authority (CCIA) and its insured, the City of Colorado Springs (collectively the respondents) filed a Petition to Review an order of Administrative Law Judge Wells (ALJ), which determined that Dr. Hall is an authorized treating physician. We dismiss the Petition to Review without prejudice. It is undisputed that Dr. Singleton is an authorized treating physician. The ALJ found that in the normal progression of authorized treatment, Dr. Singleton referred the claimant to Dr. Hall for further treatment commencing December 1996. Therefore, the ALJ determined that Dr. Hall is an authorized treating physician and that the treatment provided by Dr. Hall after the referral is authorized. We note that the claimant has moved to dismiss the Petition to Review on grounds that the ALJ's order is interlocutory. The respondents contend the claimant's motion is untimely. The respondents also assert that the ALJ's order "implicitly requires the CCIA to pay for treatment already rendered by Dr. Hall." Therefore, the respondents argue that the claimant's motion should be denied. Jurisdictional challenges may be raised at any time in a proceeding. Hasbrouck v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 780 (Colo. App. 1984). Therefore, the claimant's motion is not untimely. In any case, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent or waiver. Neoplan USA Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 778 P. 2d 312 (Colo. App. 1989). Consequently, we are obligated to determine whether we have jurisdiction to review the ALJ's order regardless of the claimant's motion. Our appellate authority is limited to the review of "final" orders. See § 8-43-301(2), C.R.S. 1998; United States Fidelity and Guaranty, Inc. v. Kourlis, 868 P.2d 1158 (Colo. App. 1994). A final order is an order "which requires any party to pay a penalty or benefits or denies a claimant a benefit or penalty." Furthermore, orders which determine liability for benefits, without determining the amount of benefits, do not award or...