4-180-470 (1998). RONALD CHAMBERS.

Case DateAugust 14, 1998
CourtColorado
Colorado Workers Compensation 1998. 4-180-470 (1998). RONALD CHAMBERS INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS OFFICEIN THE MATTER OF THE CLAIM OF RONALD CHAMBERS, Claimant, v. LYLE'S CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., Employer, and COLORADO COMPENSATION INSURANCE AUTHORITY, Insurer, Respondents.W. C. No.4-180-470FINAL ORDER The respondents seek review of a final order of Administrative Law Judge Rumler (ALJ) which determined that the claimant sustained a compensable injury to his thumb, and awarded temporary disability benefits. The respondents contend the ALJ erroneously found that the thumb injury was proximately caused by the claimant's prior industrial injury. We affirm. The claimant sustained a compensable industrial injury to his right thumb in August 1993. Consequently, the claimant underwent several surgeries including fusion of the IP and MP joints of the thumb. On May 19, 1997, the claimant was repairing a tire on his personal vehicle. It is undisputed that repair of the tire did not occur in the course of the claimant's employment, nor did it occur in the "quasi-course" of employment. As the claimant placed the tire on the pavement, it bounced. The claimant attempted to "stabilize" the tire, and reinjured his thumb. The ALJ described the injury as a "refracture just to the side of the original arthrodesis" and, relying on the testimony of Dr. Conyers, the ALJ found this site was "weakened due to the original [industrial] injury." Under these circumstances, the ALJ concluded that the August 1993 industrial injury was a proximate cause of the May 19, 1997, injury, and that the claimant's act in attempting to stabilize the tire did not "break the chain of causation" between the 1993 injury and the May 1997 injury. On review, the respondents contend the ALJ erred as a matter of law in determining that the 1993 industrial injury was a "proximate cause" of the claimant's May 1997 injury. Relying on Post Printing and Publishing Co. v. Erickson, 94 Colo. 382, 30 P.2d 327 (1934), the respondents reason that the claimant's repair of the tire was an efficient, intervening cause of the 1997 injury. We are not persuaded. Section 8-41-301(1)(c), C.R.S. 1997, provides that an injury is not compensable unless "proximately caused by an injury or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of" employment. The element of proximate cause is met if an...

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