4-369-278 (1998). DANIELLE M. GRIGSBY (Final Order 1).
Case Date | December 18, 1998 |
Court | Colorado |
Colorado Workers Compensation
1998.
4-369-278 (1998).
DANIELLE M. GRIGSBY (Final Order 1)
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS OFFICEIN THE MATTER OF THE CLAIM OF
DANIELLE M. GRIGSBY, Claimant, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., Employer,
and INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Insurer,
Respondents.W. C. No.
4-369-278FINAL ORDER The respondents seek review of an order of Administrative Law
Judge Martinez (ALJ) which determined that the claimant sustained a compensable
neck injury and awarded medical benefits. We affirm.
The ALJ found that "on or about December 1, 1996," the claimant
suffered a compensable injury to her upper extremities from the duties of her
employment which required repetitive movements and heavy lifting. Crediting the
testimony of the claimant and Dr. Krebs, the ALJ further found that the
claimant developed neck problems as a result of the industrial injury.
Consequently, the ordered the respondents to provide treatment to evaluate and
treat the claimant's neck condition.
On review the respondents do not dispute that the claimant
suffered a compensable injury to her upper extremities. However, the
respondents contest the ALJ's finding that the claimant's neck pain is a
compensable component of that injury. The respondents contend that there is no
evidence the claimant sustained an accidental injury or occupational disease
affecting her neck. We disagree.
The ALJ did not find, and the claimant does not contend that her
neck condition is the result of an accidental injury. See (Tr. p. 43). Rather,
the ALJ found that the claimant suffered a neck injury in the nature of an
occupational disease. Section 8-40-201(14), C.R.S. 1998, defines an
occupational disease as one resulting directly from the conditions under which
the work was performed, which follows as a natural incident of the work, can be
fairly traced to the employment as a "proximate cause and which does not come
from a hazard to which the worker would have been equally exposed outside the
employment." Under this statute, the claimant bears the burden of proof to
establish that a disease was directly and proximately caused by the employment.
Standard Metals Corp. v. Ball, 172 Colo. 510, 474 P.2d 622 (Colo. App. 1970).
The question of whether the claimant has sustained her burden of
proof is a factual determination for resolution by the ALJ. Coven v...
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