4254 CRB-7-00-6 (2001). Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Services.

• Court: Connecticut

Connecticut Workers Compensation 2001. 4254 CRB-7-00-6 (2001). Labadie v. Norwalk Rehabilitation Services CASE NO. 4254 CRB-7-00-6COMPENSATION REVIEW BOARD WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSIONJune 21, 2001ROSE LABADIE CLAIMANT-APPELLEE v.NORWALK REHABILITATION SERVICES EMPLOYERand CNA INSURANCE CO. INSURER RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTSAPPEARANCES: The claimant was represented by Gregory S. Kimmel, Esq., Kimmel and Kimmel, L.L.C., 9 Morgan Avenue, Norwalk, CT 06852-2013. The respondents were represented by Diane M. Lord, Esq. and Elizabeth B. Zaccardi, Esq., Law Offices of Grant H. Miller, Jr., 29 S. Main Street, Suite 310N, West Hartford, CT 06107-2445. This Petition for Review from the June 12, 2000 Finding and Award of the Commissioner acting for the Seventh District was heard February 23, 2001 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of the Commission Chairman John A. Mastropietro and Commissioners George A. Waldron and Ernie R. Walker. OPINION JOHN A. MASTROPIETRO, CHAIRMAN. The respondents have petitioned for review from the June 12, 2000 Finding and Award of the Commissioner acting for the Seventh District. They contend on appeal that the trier erred by concluding that the claimant's injury, which occurred while she was en route to a job assignment, arose out of and in the course of her employment. We find error, and reverse. Also, as the award does not sufficiently address one of the material factual issues, we remand this matter to the trial commissioner for additional findings. The parties stipulated to the following set of facts. On February 18, 1998, the claimant was employed by the respondent Norwalk Rehabilitation Services (NRS) as a certified Nursing Assistant/Home Health Care worker. She was also employed by Atrium Homecare in the same capacity. Both jobs required her to visit the homes of various patients in order to provide nursing care. On the morning in question, the claimant left her apartment and walked two flights down the stairs to another unit in the same building to tend to Peter Schmidt, a patient of Atrium Homecare. After finishing those duties, the claimant left the building and boarded a bus for the purpose of going to an apartment on Knickerbocker Avenue in Stamford. This apartment was the home of a Mrs. Karwon, who was a patient of the respondent NRS. At approximately 9:20 a.m., the claimant exited the bus and began crossing Hope Street, whereupon she was struck by a motor vehicle and seriously injured. According to the factual stipulation, NRS would reimburse the claimant for bus fare expended in traveling from one patient's home to the next patient's home whenever she happened to see more than one patient in a single day. However, NRS would not reimburse the claimant for bus fare from her home to the dwelling of her first daily patient, nor would it reimburse her for bus fare spent in traveling home from her last assignment. In his Finding and Award, the trial commissioner incorporated these two stipulated findings with a reservation. Citing the claimant's testimony, the trier determined that it was unclear whether NRS reimbursed the claimant for her travel to Mrs. Karwon's home, as the claimant never knew what was being reimbursed. Findings, ¶ 25, citing Nov. 5, 1999 Deposition, pp. 20-23. The trier also found that the claimant rarely went to her employer's Norwalk office, and that she received her assignments and paychecks at home. She filed her reports from her home, and likewise made most of her communications with the office via telephone from her apartment. Based upon these subordinate findings, he determined that the claimant's home was "tantamount to a satellite office of Employer." ¶ 22. He went on to hold that the claimant's work required her to use the public highways, and found that her boarding of the bus was to the benefit of her employer, as it enabled her to get to her assignment. On the strength of this reasoning, he concluded that the claimant's injury was compensable, from which decision the respondents have appealed. Normally, this board is required to apply a very deferential standard in reviewing the factual findings of a trial commissioner. "[T]he quintessence of a trier's factfinding prerogative is the power to determine the weight of the evidence presented and the credibility of the testimony offered by both lay and expert witnesses." Goldberg v. Ames Department Stores, 4160 CRB-1-99-2 (Dec. 19, 2000); Pallotto v. Blakeslee Prestress, Inc., 3651 CRB-3-97-7 (July 17, 1998). It is not our role to retry cases on appeal, replacing the trier's findings with our own, because the trier is generally in a far superior position to evaluate the reliability of the parties' various evidentiary submissions. The record of the instant case, however, contains no evidence in the form of marked exhibits, and there is no indication that the trial commissioner heard any testimony. Instead, the parties agreed to a...