89-3503 (1993). DONALD CRECELIUS, JR. VS. CRAFTWOOD CABINET CO.

• Court: Rhode Island

Rhode Island Worker Compensation January 1989 - December 1993. 89-3503 (1993). DONALD CRECELIUS, JR. VS. CRAFTWOOD CABINET CO Term: January 1989 - December 1993W.C.C. 89-3503DONALD CRECELIUS, JR. VS. CRAFTWOOD CABINET CO.STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS PROVIDENCE, SC. WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT DECISION OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION GILROY, J.The respondent has appealed and moved for a stay pendente lite of the mandate of a decree of Trial Judge1 (1Pursuant to P. L. 1990, Ch. 332, the Workers' Compensation Commission was established the Workers' Compensation Court, and commissioners as judges.) Rotondi, which decree was entered on August 23, 1990 and ordered, inter alia, that future payments of compensation benefits be commuted to a lump sum payment. We heard oral argument on August 28, 1990, and issued a temporary stay order for a fourteen (14) day period until September 11, 1990 in order to maintain the status quo until our decision on respondent's motion. The respondent argues in support of its motion 1) that the decision in this matter is incorrect as a matter of law; 2) that, in the absence of a stay, the respondent will be required to make the payment of the commuted benefits, and will have no practicable method of recovering those amounts if successful in its appeal; 3) that the granting of a stay will not adversely affect the employee, as the employee's regular weekly compensation payments will continue during the pendency of the appeal in the matter; 4) that the respondent "respectfully believes that it is likely to prevail on the appeal"; and finally, that the recent 1990 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act vest the Appellate Division with newly conferred jurisdiction on appeal so as to authorize the Appellate Division to "...take such further proceedings as just..."* Upon consideration of this matter and the argument of counsel, we deny the motion to stay the decree on appeal. The legislature has long recognized the dual nature of decrees in workers' compensation matters. In establishing an appellate procedure within the workers' compensation tribunal, it is clear that its statutory reference to "decrees", in the broad sense, be construed with the distinction in mind between "trial decrees" and "appellate decrees", or as the latter are captioned, "Final Decrees". This distinction is obvious by examination of the statutory reference to the "effect" of decrees. Prior to the first of the series of major revisions of the Workers' Compensation Act in 1982, the effect of "decrees" was specified in Sec. 28-35-33. It was then provided: "28-35-33. Finality of decree -- Stay of decree. -- The decree entered by the workers' compensation commission acting within its powers shall in the absence of fraud be final, and any appeal shall not stay the effect of said decree, and if benefits have been ordered to be paid, *See P.L. 1990, Ch. 332, signed into law by the governor on July 12, 1990 reduced, discontinued or suspended, the terms of the decree shall be followed until reversed by the supreme court, except that the effect of a decree of a single commissioner from which an appeal is taken to the full commission shall be stayed pending such appeal. Subject to such exception, if compensation payments have been ordered by the workers' compensation commission, such payments shall be made and continued until reversal, and if payments have not been ordered and the decree is reversed, retroactive payments shall be made from the date provided for in the decision of the supreme court. Provided, however, that an employee shall not be required to make restitution to the employer for medical benefits paid and all other benefits paid pursuant to section 28-33-5 hereof pending appeal regardless of the outcome of said appeal." (Emphasis Added) The pre-1982 version of Sec. 28-35-33 clearly recognized the distinction between decrees of a "single commissioner" and "The decree entered by the Workers' Compensation Commission" or "Full Commission" decrees. In 1982, Sec. 28-35-33 was amended by P.L. 1982, Ch. 32, Art. 1, Sec. 10. That amendment provided that: "28-35-33. Finality of decree -- Stay of decree. -- Any decree entered by the workers' compensation commission acting within its powers shall in the absence of fraud be final, and shall take effect immediately upon being entered, and enforcement of the decree shall not be stayed pending appeal. If benefits have been ordered to be paid, reduced, discontinued or suspended, the terms of the decree shall be followed until reversed. If compensation payments have been ordered by the workers' compensation commission, such payments shall be made and continued until reversal, and if payments have not been ordered and the decree is reversed, retroactive payments shall be made from the date provided for in the decision of the supreme court. Provided, however, that an employee shall not be required to make restitution to the employer for any benefits paid regardless of the outcome of said appeal." (Emphasis Added) From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that the legislature in 1982 mandated that compensation decrees take effect forthwith, as the 1982 amendment emphatically specified that any decree entered by the Workers' Compensation Commission: "...shall take effect immediately upon being entered, and enforcement of the decree shall not be stayed pending appeal. If benefits have been ordered to be paid, reduced, discontinued or suspended, the terms of the decree shall be followed until reversed..." It further specifically ordered that any modification of such payment order be only pursuant to such "...date provided for in the decision of the Supreme Court." Finally, it provided that "...an employee shall not be required to make restitution to the employer for any benefits paid regardless of the outcome of said appeal." From...