89-7935 (1993). PROVIDENCE BEVERAGE VS. DANIEL ALLEN.

• Court: Rhode Island

Rhode Island Worker Compensation January 1989 - December 1993. 89-7935 (1993). PROVIDENCE BEVERAGE VS. DANIEL ALLEN Term: January 1989 - December 1993W.C.C. 89-7935PROVIDENCE BEVERAGE VS. DANIEL ALLENSTATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS PROVIDENCE, SC. WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT APPELLATE COMMISSION DECISION OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION HEALY, J.This matter is presently before the Appellate Division in connection with an employee's claim of appeal from an adverse decision of the trial judge in connection with a petition heard in the nature of an employer's petition to review. Since this appeal turns on a procedural issue, a review of the travel of the case is important. The employee-appellant had initially received benefits pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement setting forth a date of injury of December 18, 1986 and described the nature of the injury of as a "strain/back". On February 14, 1989, the employer, through its insurer, filed a request for hearing with the former Department of Workers' Compensation seeking to discontinue or modify benefits. That request for hearing was heard at an informal conference conducted by a hearing officer of the Department of Workers' Compensation on March 30, 1989. At that time, the hearing officer found that the employee remain partially incapacitated and ordered a continuation of benefits. The preliminary determination entered by the hearing officer was thereafter appealed by the employer and docketed by this Court. The employee then filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the employer lacked standing to appeal from a preliminary determination of the Department of Workers' Compensation. Prior to proceeding to trial on the merits, the motion to dismiss was heard by the trial judge and denied. Thereafter, after full hearing, the trial judge found that the employee was no longer disabled and ordered the suspension of workers' compensation payments to the employee. This appealed ensued. The question of whether or not an employer has standing to appeal from an adverse preliminary determination rendered by the Department of Workers' Compensation following a request for hearing filed by the employer is an issue of first impression in this Court. While it may be argued that the abolition of the Department of Workers' Compensation pursuant to the provisions of PL 1990, CH. 332 renders this issue moot, more than forty (40) cases are presently pending before this Court raising this precise procedural issue, and we are, therefore, required to address it at this time. The employee, in support of his position, cites Rhode General Laws 28-33-1.1 (i) (2) (C) which states: "If the preliminary determination results in an order to reduce or suspend payment of compensation, then payment shall be reduced or suspended forthwith. The employee shall have the right to appeal that order to the commission for a de novo hearing by filing an appeal at the Department within seven (7) days of the determination. The commission hearing shall proceed on this section as 28-35-51 and 28-35-51.1." The employee argues that since this section of the Act did not specifically state that the employer has a right to appeal from adverse preliminary determination of the department on a "notice of intent to discontinue, reduce or suspend", the employer is barred from a de novo hearing before the Court. The employer, on the other hand, while conceding that section cited above does not specifically grant it a right to appeal, cites RIGL 28-33-1.1 (i) (D) which states, "any party may file an appeal to the Workers' Compensation Commission which shall proceed in accordance with rules and regulation adopted by the Commission. All proceedings before the Workers' Commission shall be de novo." The employer also cites RIGL 28-33-1.1 (j) which states: "Upon appeal from a preliminary determination of a hearing officer of the department, The Workers' Compensation Commission shall, promptly take any action it considers necessary to protect the rights of all parties, including, without limitation, requiring medical examinations, holding hearings, and making determinations and entering decrees." The employer also argues that a refusal to allow it to appeal from an adverse preliminary determination entered by a hearing officer of the Department of Workers' Compensation would be violative of its due process rights to a hearing on the merits which would, in effect, impose an unconstitutional interpretation on this section. In order to fully appreciate the controversy presented and to arrive at a sensible determination of the issues, some historical perspective is essential. In 1985, the General Assembly passed Chapter 365, 1 as a significant reform of the Workers' Compensation System. As part of this reform effort, the Department of Workers' Compensation was created as a new executive department of the State Government and this Department assumed control of all administrative functions relating to our Workers' Compensation System. The powers and duties of the Division of Workers' Compensation which were formerly under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor were transferred to this new Department in a desire to centralize all administrative processes within a centralized, specialized and, hopefully, more efficient department. One of the primary functions assigned to the new Department of Workers' Compensation was the implementation of a new informal dispute resolution process. To this end, the Department of Workers' Compensation, pursuant to RIGL 42-94-5 (h) was authorized to appoint hearing officers to hear controversies to the employee and employer on an informal basis. In addition, 42-94-5 provided for the provision of employee assistants whose first charge was "to provide advice and assistance to employee's under the Workers' Compensation Act and particularly to assist employees in preparing for and assisting at informal conferences under 28-33-1.1". The provision for hearing officers and employee assistants was part of the "early pay system" envisioned by Rhode Island General Laws 28-33-1.1. The avowed intention of the early pay system was to implement a simple and efficient method to provide the payment of weekly compensation benefits to deserving employees and to expedite the termination of payment of benefits to those employees who could no longer demonstrate an entitlement. One facet of this early pay system was a requirement that the employer pay or contest a claim with a 14-day period of time and a further requirement was that a failure to file a notice of controversy within 44 days would result in a binding admission of liability. The subsequent step in this process was the informal hearing held at the Department of Workers' Compensation. The hearing officer was required to conduct an informal hearing following the filing of a notice of controversy. Under the terms R.I.G.L. 28-33-1.1 (i)(B), the hearing officer was required to conduct an informal conference with an eye to resolving controversies or misunderstandings which may have arisen with reference to a workers' compensation claim and to thereafter render a preliminary determination. It is important to note that under the terms of this section, the hearing officer was not bound by formal rules of evidence and, further, that either party was entitled to file an appeal to the workers' compensation commission for trial de novo. The second portion of the informal dispute resolution process dealt with an employer's notice of intent to discontinue, reduce or suspend. Under the terms of this section, the hearing officer was once again not bound by formal rules of evidence and was once again empowered "to make every effort to resolve any controversies or misunderstandings". There was, finally, the general provision in R.I.G.L. 28-33-1.1 (j) which empowered the workers' compensation commission to take any action it may consider necessary to protect the rights of all parties. While it is clear that the R.I.G.L. 21-33-1.1 (i) (2) (c), does not specifically provide for a right of appeal on the part of the employer, the focus of our decision must be to determine whether or not the other sections cited do provide for such an appeal or whether or not the right of appeal can be presumed from a reading of the entire statute. In conducting this inquiry, however, this Court is bound by certain well accepted rules of statutory construction. In the first instance, it must be noted that where there is a real or seeming ambiguity in the statute, it is the duty of the Court to ascertain the intention of the legislature from a consideration of the entire statute, keeping in mind its nature, object, language and intents Zannelli v. DiSandro 121 A.2d 652, 84 R.I. 776 (RI 1956). In Zannelli, supra, our Supreme Court was asked to examine the actions of the Rhode Island Racing and Athletic Hearing Board in denying a fighter's request for a license. The appellant's argument in that matter was that the statute under consideration did not confer upon the Board the power to deny a request for license and that the Board was, therefore, without power to so act. The Court noted that in reviewing the statute, they were bound by the presumption that the legislature, in enacting the statute, did not intend an unreasonable or absurd result, 84 R.I. 76, 82. The Court thereafter construed the statute in a manner which authorized the board to deny an applicant's request for a boxing license...