Abney v. Energy, 120804 CAWC, GRO 024430

Case DateDecember 08, 2004
CourtCalifornia
MYRON ABNEY, Applicant,
v.
AERA ENERGY; and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant(s).
No. GRO 024430
California Workers Compensation Decisions
Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board State Of California
December 8, 2004
          OPINION AND DECISION AFTER RECONSIDERATION (EN BANC)           MERLE C. RABINE, CHAIRMAN.          The Appeals Board granted reconsideration in this matter to allow time to study the record and applicable law. Because of the important legal issue presented as to the meaning and application of Senate Bill (SB) 899 (Stats. 2004, ch. 34) enacted April 19, 2004, to the penalty issues in this case under Labor Code section 5814,1 and in order to secure uniformity of decision in the future, the Chairman of the Appeals Board, upon a majority vote of its members, assigned this case to the Appeals Board as a whole for an en banc decision. (Lab. Code, §115.)2          For the reasons discussed below, we hold that section 5814, as enacted by SB 899 and operative June 1, 2004, applies to unreasonable delays or refusals to pay compensation that occur prior to the operative date where the finding of unreasonable delay is made on or after June 1, 2004. We also conclude that section 5814(c), involving the conclusive presumption of the resolution of accrued penalty claims, applies as of the June 1, 2004 operative date of section 5814, and that the statute of limitations set forth in section 5814(g) applies to actions to recover penalties brought on or after the June 1, 2004 operative date.          BACKGROUND          The relevant facts of this case do not appear to be in dispute. In a Findings and Award issued on April 14, 2003, it was determined that applicant, while employed as a reliability specialist from 1996 to September 21, 2000, sustained industrial injury to his hands and wrists, causing temporary disability from January 16, 2001, to date and continuing, and the need for further medical treatment. The parties stipulated that applicant's compensation rate for temporary disability indemnity was maximum.          On March 26, 2004, applicant filed a petition for penalty under section 5814, alleging that defendant unreasonably delayed increasing his temporary disability benefit rate as required by section 4661.5 and Hofmeister v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 848 [49 Cal.Comp.Cases 438], which provide that payment of temporary disability indemnity two or more years after the date of injury is to be made at the rate in effect on the date of payment. Following a July 26, 2004 hearing on the issue, the WCJ issued a Findings and Award on August 5, 2004. The WCJ determined that defendant unreasonably delayed adjustment of the applicant's temporary disability indemnity rate from $490.00 to $602.00 per week beginning April 15, 2003, and $602.00 to $728.00 per week beginning January 1, 2004. In accordance with new section 5814, which became operative on June 1, 2004, the WCJ found the defendant liable for a penalty in the amount of $658.00 (25% of the delayed payment), less credit to defendant for $263.20 in section 4650(d) penalty payments, for a net payment of $394.80.          Applicant timely petitioned for reconsideration from the WCJ's decision, contending that it was error to apply the newly enacted section 5814 to this case because the legislation revising that section, SB 899, does not contain a retroactivity clause, and there is no evidence that the Legislature intended the new penalty provision to apply to delays that had occurred prior to June 1, 2004. Therefore, applicant argues that he is entitled to a 10 percent increase on all past, present and future temporary disability indemnity under section 5814 as it existed prior to the enactment of SB 899.          DISCUSSION          A. SECTION 5814, AS ENACTED BY SB 899 AND OPERATIVE JUNE 1, 2004, APPLIES TO UNREASONABLE DELAYS OR REFUSALS TO PAY COMPENSATION THAT OCCUR PRIOR TO THE OPERATIVE DATE WHERE THE FINDING OF UNREASONABLE DELAY IS MADE ON OR AFTER JUNE 1, 2004.          At the time of the unreasonable delays in this case, section 5814 provided as follows:
"When payment of compensation has been unreasonably delayed or refused, either prior to or subsequent to the issuance of an award, the full amount of the order, decision, or award shall be increased by 10 percent. Multiple increases shall not be awarded for repeated delays in making a series of payments due for the same type or specie of benefit unless there has been a legally significant event between the delay and the subsequent delay in payments of the same type or specie of benefits. The question of delay and the reasonableness of the cause therefor shall be determined by the appeals board in accordance with the facts. This delay or refusal shall constitute good cause under Section 5803 to rescind, alter, or amend the order, decision, or award for the purpose of making the increase provided for herein."
         Section 5814, as enacted by SB 899, now provides:
"(a) When payment of compensation has been unreasonably delayed or refused, either prior to or subsequent to the issuance of an award, the amount of the payment unreasonably delayed or refused shall be increased up to 25 percent or up to ten thousand dollars ($10,000), whichever is less. In any proceeding under this section, the appeals board shall use its discretion to accomplish a fair balance and substantial justice between the parties.
"(b) If a potential violation of this section is discovered by the employer prior to an employee claiming a penalty under this section, the employer, within 90 days of the date of discovery, may pay a self-imposed penalty in the amount of 10 percent of the amount unreasonably delayed or refused, along with the amount of the payment delayed or refused. This self-imposed penalty shall be in lieu of the penalty in subdivision (a).
"(c) Upon the approval of a compromise and release, findings and awards, or stipulations and orders by the appeals board, it shall be conclusively presumed that any accrued claims of penalty have been resolved, regardless of whether a petition for penalty has been filed, unless the claim for penalty is expressly excluded by the terms of the order or award. Upon the submission of any issue for determination at a regular trial hearing, it shall be conclusively presumed that any accrued claim for penalty in connection with the benefit at
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