AGO 07-2.

• Case Date: March 20, 2007
• Court: Maine

Maine Attorney General Opinions 2007. AGO 07-2. STATE OF MAINE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL6 STATE HOUSE STATIONAUGUSTA, MAINE 043330006 March 20, 200707-02The Honorable Jeremy FischerMaine House of Representatives 2 State House Station Augusta, Maine 04333 RE: L.D. 275, An Act to Protect Child Victims of Sexual AbuseDear Representative Fischer: In response to your request to review the constitutionality of L.D. 275, An Act to Protect Child Victims of Sexual Abuse, it is my opinion that a court would likely conclude that the proposed legislation is constitutional, provided it is properly applied. Should the Legislature decide to enact LD 275, we recommend clarifications to conform the language of the bill more closely to the requirements of the case law. Relevant Case Law. As the bill summary recognizes, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) dramatically changed the focus of Sixth Amendment confrontation clause jurisprudence from whether a hearsay statement contained "particular guarantees of trustworthiness" to whether the statement was "testimonial" or "nontestimonial." Different standards apply to the admissibility of statements in each category. In Crawford, the Supreme Court did not define what it meant by the term "testimonial," but suggested that former trial testimony, grand jury testimony, and statements obtained during police interrogations would constitute testimonial statements. The Court held that before a "testimonial" out-of-court hearsay statement can be admitted at a criminal defendant's trial, the person who made the statement must be "unavailable" to testify at trial (due to, for example, death, incapacity, or invocation of a privilege) and the defendant must have had a prior opportunity to subject that person to cross-examination about the statement. On the other hand, if the out-of-court hearsay statement was "nontestimonial," then the two prerequisites for admissibility of testimonial statements under Crawford would not apply. The Crawford decision observed that "[m]ost of the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial," 541 U.S. 36, 56, and therefore such nontestimonial statements did not raise the same Sixth Amendment concerns as testimonial statements. The United States Court of Appeals for the First...