AGO 1978-015.

• Case Date: June 21, 1978
• Court: Wyoming

Wyoming Attorney General Opinions 1978. AGO 1978-015. 1978-015June 21, 1978June 21, 1978 TO: The Honorable Diemer True Wyoming State Legislature BY: John J. Rooney Attorney General (Acting) Peter J. Mulvaney Senior Assistant Attorney General QUESTION: Does W.S. 9-5-217(e) as amended during the 1978 legislative session prohibit the payment of the additional $1.00 per month for each year of service from being paid to retirees not currently living in Wyoming.ANSWER: No. DISCUSSION In pertinent part, this statute reads as follows: ...effective July 1, 1978, the amount of allowance for Wyoming residents as defined by W.S. 39-6-701(a)(ii) shall be increased one dollar ($1.00) per month for each year of service in Wyoming. (emphasis supplied). Some confusion seems to have arisen because of the underscored language. However, reference to the statute defining "Wyoming residents" clears up that confusion. The cited section reads: (a) As used in this article: (ii) 'Residents' means persons who have actually resided in Wyoming for at least one (1) year prior to application for a refund under this article. The "this article" referred to is Article 7 of Title 39 of the statutes. Article 7 is entitled "Tax Refund to Elderly and Disabled." By the definition, we see that persons must have actually resided in Wyoming one year prior to applying for the tax refund. Since the retirement program and the tax refund program have nothing to do with each other, and since the legislature chose to adopt this definition by reference in the retirement act rather than insert a definition in that act, it is reasonable to conclude that what the legislature intended was that the increase be awarded to those who were Wyoming residents prior to applying for retirement. It would be unreasonable to assume the legislature was requiring that in order to get the increase, a retiree would also have to have been eligible to apply for the tax refund. Rules of statutory construction require that a rational and sensible construction be placed on statutes where there is any vagueness or ambiguity in the act. Sutherland says: ...unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another that produces a reasonable result.... 2A Sutherland, 4th Ed., Sec. 45.12. ...