AGO 1978 No. 13.
Case Date | May 01, 1978 |
Court | Washington |
Washington Attorney General Opinions
1978.
AGO 1978 No. 13.
May 1, 1978[Orig. Op. Page 1]PRIVATECITIES AND TOWNS -- DISTRICTS --
PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICTS -- CONSERVATION -- CONTRACTS -- SALES OF CONSERVATION
MATERIALS TO PUBLIC UTILITY CONSUMERS(1) The
provisions of Article VIII, § 7 of the Washington Constitution prohibit a
city or public utility district from assisting its utility customers,
generally, in the purchase of such conservation materials as insulation or
storm windows fromPRIVATEsuppliers by providing to the seller a guarantee of payment of part or
all of the agreed upon purchase price for the conservation materials
involved.(2) The same provisions of Article VIII,
§ 7 of the Washington Constitution, however, do not prohibit a city or
public utility district from itself purchasing and then later selling such
conservation materials to its customers, generally, by means of installment
contracts under which payment of the purchase price, plus a service charge,
would be made by the purchasers on a periodic basis over a specified period of
time.Honorable R. Ted
Bottiger State Senator, 2nd District 8849
Pacific Avenue Tacoma, Washington 98444Cite as : AGO 1978 No. 13Dear Sir:
By letter previously acknowledged you have requested our opinion
on two questions which we paraphrase as follows:
(1) Do the provisions of Article VIII, § 7 of the Washington
Constitution prohibit a city or public utility district from assisting its
utility customers, generally, in the purchase of such conservation materials
as
[Orig. Op. Page 2]
insulation or storm windows from
PRIVATE
suppliers by providing to the seller a guarantee of payment of
part or all of the agreed upon purchase price for the conservation materials
involved?
(2) Do the provisions of Article VIII, § 7 of the Washington
Constitution prohibit a city or public utility district from itself purchasing
and then later selling such conservation materials to its customers, generally,
by means of installment contracts under which payment of the purchase price,
plus a service charge, would be made by the purchasers on a periodic basis over
a specified period of time:
(a) Where legal title to the materials involved is retained by
the seller as security until the full purchase price is paid?
(b) Where legal title to the materials is not retained but a
security interest in those materials and/or in the real property where they are
being installed is obtained by the seller?
(c) Where neither of the above types of security interest is
retained or obtained by the seller?
We answer question (1) in the affirmative and question (2) in the
negative as qualified in our analysis.
ANALYSIS
Article VIII, § 7 of the Washington Constitution reads as
follows:
"No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall
hereafter give any money, or property, or loan its money, or credit to or in
aid of any individual, association, company or corporation, except for the
necessary support of the poor and infirm, or become directly or indirectly the
owner of any stock in or bonds of any association, company or
corporation."
[Orig. Op. Page 3]
As will readily be seen, this provision of our constitution
actually contains the following four separate prohibitions which are here
relevant:
(1) A prohibition against gifts of money;
(2) A prohibition against gifts of property;
(3) A prohibition against loans of money; and
(4) A prohibition against the lending of municipal
credit.(fn1)
Two exceptions to these prohibitions also should be preliminarily
noted, one express and the other the product of judicial interpretation. The
express exception, of course, covers aid to persons in need;
i.e., the poor and infirm. See, State v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 20 Wn.2d 588, 148 P.2d 323 (1944) and
Morgan v. Dept. of Social Security, 14 Wn.2d 156, 127
P.2d 686 (1942). And the further exception resulting from court decisions
relates to gifts or loans to other governmental agencies - in other words,
strictly intergovernmental transactions. See Rands v. Clarke
County, 79 Wash. 152, 139 Pac. 1090 (1914);
cf., Anderson v. O'Brien, 84
Wn.2d 64, 524 P.2d 390 (1974). For the purposes of this opinion, however,
neither of these two exceptions will be deemed to be applicable since both of
your questions speak of assistance to utility customers,
generally, rather than to some particular class of
customers.
It should also be observed at the outset that the same four
prohibitions (and two exceptions) are likewise applicable to the state
itself--but by reason of a somewhat differently worded constitutional
provision; i.e., Article VIII, § 5 which reads as
follows:
"The credit of the state shall not, in any manner be given or
loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association, company or
corporation."
[Orig. Op. Page 4]
What has happened, over the years, is that this
prohibition--although it is expressed only in terms of the lending of
credit--has been read and applied by the court to cover gifts or loans of money
or property as well. See, e.g., Hwy. Com.
v. Pac. NW Bell Tel. Co., 59 Wn.2d 216, 367 P.2d 605 (1961);
Anderson v. O'Brien, supra;
Morgan v. Dept. of Social Security,
supra; and State v. Guaranty Trust
Co., supra. As a consequence, however,
while the line between the four prohibitions has generally been fairly well
delineated in those cases which have involved municipal transactions under
Article VIII, § 7, it has, on occasion, been somewhat blurred in
comparable cases relating to state expenditures. Compare, for example,
Highway Comm. v. Pac. N.W. Bell Tel. Co.,
supra, with Gruen v. State Tax
Commission, 35 Wn.2d 1, 211 P.2d 651 (1949). Nevertheless, the
line does exist and we will take care to heed it in dealing with your two
specific questions:
Question (1):
We will deal first with your question relating to the offering of
guarantees of payment in connection with the purchase of conservation materials
because, in our judgment, the answer to that question is quite clear. Even in
the limited sense in which the term "loan of credit" has been defined by the
state supreme court in Gruen v. State Tax Commission,
supra, and State ex rel. O'Connell v.
PUD, 2 Wn.App. 366, 469 P.2d 922 (1970),(fn2) it seems apparent
that the legal relationship thus contemplated would involve an unconstitutional
lending of municipal credit. In Gruen, the Washington
court followed the lead of Grout v. Kendall, 195 Iowa
467, 192 N.W. 529 (1923), in which the Iowa court had earlier interpreted a
similarly worded provision of its state constitution as having
". . . withheld from the constituted authorities of the state
all power or function of suretyship. It forbade the
incurring of obligations by the indirect method of secondary liability. This is
the field and the full scope of this section. It does not purport to deal with
the creation of a primary indebtedness for any purpose whatever. . . ."(fn3)
(Emphasis theirs)
[Orig. Op. Page 5]
And in State ex rel. O'Connell v. PUD,
supra, a division of our state court of appeals
likewise reiterated the same view that the constitutional prohibition against
the lending of credit bars a guaranty or surety type of relationship. Clearly,
therefore, that particular prohibition covers the scheme contemplated by your
first question for such, obviously, is exactly what would there be
involved.(fn4) Accordingly, as above indicated, your first question must
necessarily be answered in the affirmative; i.e., the
provisions of Article VIII, § 7, supra,
do prohibit a city or public utility district from
assisting its utility customers in the purchase of such conservation materials
as insulation or storm windows from
PRIVATE
suppliers by providing to the seller a guaranty of payment of
part of all or the agreed upon purchase price for the materials
involved.
[Orig. Op. Page 6]
Question (2):
When we turn, on the other hand, to the alternative approach
contemplated by your second question a different situation is presented.
Because the conservation materials would be purchased
from the city or public utility district a valuable consideration would be
present so as clearly to obviate the possibility of an unconstitutional gift.
And because the role of the municipality would be that of vendor rather than
guarantor or surety, the legal relationship involved would not fall within the
definition of a "loan of credit" which was adopted by our state supreme court
in Gruen, supra, and by the
court of appeals in O'Connell v. PUD,
supra.(fn5) The issue, accordingly, becomes that of
whether a retail installment sale of goods or materials by a municipality in
our state would nevertheless still run afoul of the constitution--either as a
loan of money (which, as we have seen, is also prohibited) or as a different
kind of loan of credit. Before we address ourselves directly to that issue,
however, there is a threshold question which must be resolved, also involving
Article VIII, § 7, supra, because of the recent
decision of the Washington court in Lassila v. City of
Wenatchee, 89 Wn.2d 804, P.2d
(1978).
In essence, the factual situation in
Lassila was as follows: The City of Wenatchee, acting
through its city commissioners, decided to create a community center to be
located near the Columbia River and adjacent to the city's central business
district. Accordingly, it commenced negotiations for the purchase of several
tracts of land (then in
PRIVATE
ownership) for this purpose and, on March 31 and...
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