AGO 1989-007.

Case DateJanuary 31, 1989
CourtKansas
Kansas Attorney General Opinions 1989. AGO 1989-007. January 31, 1989The Honorable Herman G. Dillon State Representative Thirty-Second District State Capitol Room 273 W Topeka, Kansas 66612 ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 89-7Re: Drainage and Levees--Drainage Districts Within Counties or Cities--Position of Director of Drainage District Not Incompatible With That of State Representative Synopsis: Neither Kansas statutes nor the common law doctrine of incompatibility of offices precludes one person from holding the position of drainage district director simultaneously with that of state representative. Cited herein: K.S.A. 24-401. * * * Dear Representative Dillon: You ask whether you may serve on the board of directors of Kaw Valley Drainage District of Wyandotte County and retain your position in the Kansas House of Representatives. Kaw Valley Drainage District was organized pursuant to K.S.A. 24-401 et seq., and none of the statutes applicable to the district prohibit a director from simultaneously holding another office. Similarly, there is no statutory restriction which would prevent a state representative from simultaneously serving on the board of directors of a drainage district. Therefore, this situation would appear to be governed by decisions of the Kansas Supreme Court which state that an individual can hold more than one public office, provided there is no incompatibility between the offices. Dyche v. Davis, 92 Kan. 971 (1914), Congdon v. Knapp, 106 Kan. 206 (1920). The question of whether the offices of drainage district director and state representative are incompatible has not been dealt with specifically by any Kansas case law. However, there are authorities which deal with the problem of incompatibility generally which can be applied here. In Abry v. Gray, 58 Kan. 148 (1897), the Kansas Supreme Court adopted the essential language of 19 American and English Encyclopedia of Law, 562, as follows:
"'The incompatibility which will operate to vacate the first office must be something more than the mere physical impossibility of the performance of the duties of the two offices by one person, and may be said to arise where the nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper, from considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both.'"
Subsequently, in Dyche v. Davis, ...

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