AGO 2002-05.

• Case Date: October 11, 2002
• Court: Indiana

Indiana Attorney General Opinions 2002. AGO 2002-05. October 11, 2002Advisory Opinion 2002-5Mr. Charles Johnson, III, CPA State Examiner State Board of Accounts 302 West Washington Street 4th Floor, Room E418 Indianapolis, Indiana 46204-2765 RE: Payment by Public Employers of Group Health Insurance Premiums Dear Mr. Johnson: This letter responds to your request for an advisory letter on the following questions: May a public employer pay the full amount of group health insurance premiums for its employees under Ind. Code § 5-10-8-2.6 and Ind. Code § 5-10-8-3.1? What is the application of these statutes in situations where a collective bargaining agreement exists? It is our opinion that public employers may not pay the full amount of group health insurance premiums for their employees. Ind. Code § 5-10-8-2.6(c) clearly states that employers may pay a part of the cost of group insurance and this language has been interpreted by past Attorneys General to exclude the possibility of allowing employers to pay the full amount. Because it is not permissible to bargain for a term that is contrary to statute or public policy, the existence of a collective bargaining agreement allowing full payment by employers would not alter this conclusion. See Ahuja v. Lynco Ltd. Medical Research, 675 N.E.2d 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Gary Teachers Union, Local No. 4 v. School City of Gary, 165 Ind. App. 314, 332 N.E.2d 256 (1975). ANALYSIS I. Public Employers May Not Pay the Full Amount of Their Employees Group Health Insurance Premiums Ind. Code § 5-10-8-2.6 states that public employers may provide programs of group insurance for their employees and retired employees. The statute provides in pertinent part: A public employer may pay a part of the cost of group insurance . . . Ind. Code § 5-10-8-2.6(c) (emphasis added). In interpreting the meaning of a statute, the primary goal is to discern the legislative intent behind it. Woods v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). To determine the legislatures intent, courts will look to the plain language of the statute. N. Miami Educ. Assn v. N. Miami Cmty. Schools, 746 N.E.2d 380, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). If a statute has not been previously construed, its interpretation is controlled by the express language of the statute and by application of the general rules of statutory...