AGO 96-F-022.

• Court: North Dakota

North Dakota Attorney General Opinions 1996. AGO 96-F-022. STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINION 96-F-22Date issued: November 22, 1996Requested by: Representative Bill Oban- QUESTION PRESENTED - Whether a statewide election recount authorized by N.D.C.C. § 16.1-16-01(4) must be held within seven days after the date the Secretary of State notifies county auditors to conduct recounts. - ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OPINION - It is my opinion that a statewide election recount authorized by N.D.C.C. § 16.1-16-01(4) must be held within seven days after the date the Secretary of State gives notice to the county auditors to conduct recounts. - ANALYSIS - N.D.C.C. § 16.1-16-01(4) provides, in part, as follows: Within four days after the canvass of the votes by the state canvassing board in the case of congressional, state, district, or legislative elections, the secretary of state shall notify all the county auditors to conduct recounts as required by subsection 1 and, when a timely recount demand is received and it is in proper form, as required by subsection 2. The secretary of state shall fix the date of the recounts within seven days after giving notice that the auditor must conduct the recount. (Emphasis supplied.) The language in N.D.C.C. § 16.1-16-01(4) that "[t]he secretary of state shall fix the date of the recounts within seven days after giving notice that the auditor must conduct the recount" has been subject to two varying interpretations. One is that the Secretary of State has seven days to specify the date of an election recount after giving notice to the county auditors of a recount, but that the date specified could occur beyond the seven-day period. The other interpretation is that the recount itself must be held within seven days after the Secretary of State gives notice to the county auditors. A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that courts are to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. The Legislature's intent must be sought initially from the language of the statute. District 1 Republican Com. v. District 1 Democratic Com., 466 N.W.2d 820, 824 (N.D. 1991). If statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the legislative intent is presumed to be clear from the face of the statute. If, however, statutory language is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may look to extrinsic aids to aid...