AGO 97016.

CourtNebraska
Nebraska Attorney General Opinions 1997. AGO 97016. DATE: March 5, 1997SUBJECT: LB 100; Constitutionality of a bill which would specify that newspaper carriers are employees for purposes of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation statutes.REQUESTED BY: Senator Edward J. Schrock Nebraska State LegislatureWRITTEN BY: Don Stenberg, Attorney General Dale A. Comer, Assistant Attorney General Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-115 (Cum. Supp. 1996) specifies, in some detail, what the terms "employee" and "worker" should be construed to include for purposes of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. LB 100 would add a new subsection 5 to § 48- 115 in order to have that statute read, in pertinent part: The terms employee and worker are used interchangeably and have the same meaning throughout the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Such terms include the plural and all ages and both sexes and shall be construed to mean: * * * * (5) Every person who delivers or distributes newspapers for the owner or operator of a newspaper business or the owner or owners of a business hired to deliver or distribute newspapers shall be an employee of such business under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. (emphasis added). You state that you have "several grave concerns about LB 100," and therefore you have posed two questions to us concerning its constitutionality. Your first question involves a concern that the language of LB 100 emphasized above is "extremely vague and ambiguous." You point out that "every person" could include a newspaper carrier along with a host of other persons such as parents, spouses, etc., who might be involved at some time and in some way in the delivery process. You also point out that "every person" could include people who are in the delivery business who are hired to transport or distribute newspapers together with other products such as auto parts or beauty supplies. Your concern extends further to the terms "such business," "operator of a newspaper business," and "owners of a newspaper business hired to deliver or distribute newspapers" which you also believe are extremely ambiguous and unclear. In light of these concerns, you ask: . . . should LB100 be deemed void for vagueness based on the due process guarantees of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, section 3, of our Nebraska Constitution? Persons of ordinary intelligence should not have to guess at its meaning especially when violations of Nebraska's workers' compensation laws can have criminal ramifications (see, e.g. Neb. Rev. Stat. Sec. 48- 144.04). With respect to state legislation such as the language at issue in LB 100, the void for vagueness doctrine is based on the due process requirements contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and in Article I, section 3, of the Nebraska Constitution. U.S. v. Articles of Drug, 825 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1987). In order to pass constitutional muster, a statute must be sufficiently specific so that persons of ordinary intelligence do not have to guess at its meaning, and the statute must contain ascertainable standards by which it may be applied. Articles of Drug, 825 F.2d at 1243. The void for vagueness doctrine applies to both criminal and civil statutes. Id. at 1244. However, greater vagueness is...

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