AGO IAL 021908.

• Case Date: February 19, 2008
• Court: New Mexico

New Mexico Attorney Gen eral Opinions 2008. AGO IAL 021908. February 19, 2008IAL 021908Ronald ReevesTenth Judicial District Attorney P.O. Box 1141 Tucumcari, NM 88401 Re: Opinion Request - Statutory Requirements for Vacating TownsiteDear Mr. Reeves: Your office requested our advice concerning the statutory requirements for vacating a portion of the former townsite of Montoya, created from federal lands in the early 1900's, next to what was then a railroad right-of-way. More specifically, you have asked whether the Board of County Commissioners for Quay County (the "Commission") needs to take any action when the owner of the land being vacated complies with the requirements of NMSA 1978, Section 19-4-6 (1884). We understand that your office has advised the Commission that it need take no further action once the owner has complied with Section 19-4-6. The owner's counsel, however, believes that the Commission must also follow the requirements of NMSA 1978, Sections 67-5-1 through 67-5-21, even though no county roads have ever been established on the land. Based on our examination of the relevant constitutional, statutory and case law authorities, and the information available to us at this time, we conclude that Section 19-4-6 does not require the Commission to take any action to complete the vacation of the townsite or any portion thereof by its owners. We further conclude that the requirements of Sections 67-5-1 through 67-5-21 are not applicable to the instant case because, at no time since the establishment of the townsite of Montoya, has any county road been established and maintained by the County as a public highway on the land. As a preliminary matter, there are several rules of statutory construction that guide our analysis. First, in construing a statute, our goal is to give primary effect to legislative intent, which intent is evidenced primarily through the statute's language. See Souter v. Ancae Heating and Air Conditioning, 2002-NMCA-078, 132 N.M. 608, 611. Second, under the plain meaning rule, we give statutory language its ordinary and plain meaning unless the Legislature indicates a different interpretation is necessary. See Cooper v. Chevron, 2002-NMSC-020, 132 N.M. 382, 388. Section 19-4-6 sets forth the requirements that must be followed when the owners of a tract of land filed upon, platted and recorded...