AGO IAL 040208a.

• Case Date: April 02, 2008
• Court: New Mexico

New Mexico Attorney Gen eral Opinions 2008. AGO IAL 040208a. April 2, 2008IAL 040208aThe Honorable Gail ChaseyNew Mexico State Representative 1206 Las Lomas Rd. NE Albuquerque, NM 87106 Re: Opinion Request - Scope of Athletic Trainer PracticeDear Representative Chasey: You have requested our advice concerning House Bill 88, 2007 N.M. Laws, ch. 347, § 1 ("HB 88"), which amended Section 52-4-1 of the New Mexico Workers' Compensation Act and added licensed athletic trainer to the definition of health care provider. More specifically, you ask (1) whether HB 88 authorizes an athletic trainer, licensed pursuant to the Athletic Trainer Practice Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 61-14D-1 through 61-14D-19 (1993) (the "Act"), to treat a worker who is not an "athlete," as that term is defined in the Act, and (2) whether a licensed athletic trainer who willfully treated a worker he or she knew was not an "athlete" would be subject to discipline under Section 61-14D-16(A)(7) for willfully practicing beyond the scope of "athletic training," as defined in the Act. Based on our examination of the relevant New Mexico statutes, opinions and case law authorities, and on the information available to us at this time, we conclude that HB 88 does not authorize an athletic trainer, licensed pursuant to the Athletic Trainer Act, to treat a worker who is not an athlete injured in an athletic setting. We further conclude that the Athletic Trainer Practice Board may properly subject a licensed athletic trainer to discipline if, based on substantial evidence, it finds that the athletic trainer willfully or negligently practiced athletic training beyond his or her authorized scope of practice. As a preliminary matter, there are several rules of statutory construction that guide our analysis. First, in construing a statute, our goal is to give effect to legislative intent, which intent is evidenced primarily through the statute's language. See Souter v. Ancae Heating and Air Conditioning, 2002-NMCA-078, 132 N.M. 608, 611. Second, under the plain meaning rule, we give statutory language its ordinary and plain meaning unless the Legislature indicates a different interpretation is necessary. See Cooper v. Chevron, 2002-NMSC-020, 132 N.M. 382, 388. We read statutes concerning the same subject matter together as harmoniously as possible in a way that...