Bartimoccia v. Hulett Trucking, LLC, 010720 VTWC, 01-20WC

• Case Date: January 07, 2020
• Court: Vermont

John J. Bartimoccia v. Hulett Trucking, LLC Opinion No. 01-20WC Vermont Workers Compensation Decisions State of Vermont Department of Labor January 7, 2020          State File No. LL-55598           Wesley L. Pollock, Esq., for Claimant.           Jennifer K. Moore, Esq., for Defendant.           Stephen W. Brown, Administrative Law Judge.          RULING ON CLAIMANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT           Michael A. Harrington, Interim Commissioner.          ISSUE PRESENTED:          Does Vermont’s seatbelt statute, 23 V.S.A. § 1259, preclude Defendant from asserting a defense under 21 V.S.A. § 649 based on Claimant’s alleged failure to wear a seatbelt during a work-related automobile accident?          EXHIBITS:          Claimant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“CSUMF”)

Claimant’s Exhibit 1 May 13, 2019 Notice and Application for Hearing (Form 6)

Claimant’s Exhibit 2 May 14, 2019 Correspondence from Department of Labor

Claimant’s Exhibit 3 May 29, 2019 Correspondence from Defendant’s Counsel

Claimant’s Exhibit 4 June 11, 2019 Correspondence from Department of Labor

         Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“DSUMF”)          Defendant’s Exhibit A October 24, 2018 Medical Records from Southwestern Vermont Medical Center          BACKGROUND:          The following material facts are undisputed:

1. This claim arises out of a 2018 automobile roll-over that occurred during Claimant’s employment with Defendant. See CSUMF 1-3; DSUMF 1-2. Defendant asserts that Claimant was not wearing a seatbelt at the time of the accident. See CSUMF 4-5; DSUMF 2.

         CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:          Summary Judgment          1. To prevail on a summary judgment motion, the moving party must show that there exist no genuine issues of material fact, such that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. Samplid Enterprises, Inc. v. First Vermont Bank, 165 Vt. 22, 25 (1996). In ruling on such a motion, the non-moving party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences. State v. Delaney, 157 Vt. 247, 252 (1991); Toys, Inc. v. F.M. Burlington Co., 155 Vt. 44, 48 (1990).          Relevant Statutory Provisions          2. This case involves the intersection of two statutory provisions: 21 V.S.A. § 649 and 23 V.S.A. § 1259(c).          3. On the one hand, 21 V.S.A. § 649 provides that workers’ compensation benefits “shall not be allowed for an injury caused by … an employee's failure to use a safety appliance provided for his or her use.” Id. Defendant contends that Claimant’s non-use of a seatbelt was a failure to use a “safety appliance provided for his use,” thus barring his claim under 21 V.S.A. § 649. Defendant bears the burden of proof on this affirmative defense. See id.          4. On the other hand, 23 V.S.A. § 1259 is Vermont’s seatbelt statute. Subject to enumerated exceptions, this statute imposes criminal liability on the operator of a motor vehicle if any adult is occupying a seat with a federally approved safety belt but is not wearing it. See id. However, Subsection (c) of the statute provides that “[n]oncompliance with the provisions of this section shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil proceeding.” Id.          5. Citing the seatbelt statute’s exclusionary rule, Claimant contends Defendant cannot lawfully present any evidence that Claimant was not wearing his seatbelt at the time of the accident. Without that evidence, he argues, Defendant cannot prevail on its “safety appliance” defense under Section 649.^[1]          Workers’ Compensation Proceedings Are Not “Civil Proceedings”          6. By its terms, the seatbelt statute’s exclusionary rule only applies to “any civil proceeding.” 23 V.S.A. § 1259(c). Therefore, it only applies to workers’ compensation cases if they are “civil” in nature. For the reasons below, I...