Beamish, 112531 PAAGO, AGO 33

Case DateNovember 25, 1931
CourtPennsylvania
Honorable Richard J. Beamish,
AGO 33
Opinion No. 33
Pennsylvania Attorney General Opinions
Opinions of the Attorney General
November 25, 1931
         Corporations—Fictitious Names—Acts of June 28, 1917, P. L. 645 and June 29, 1923, P. L. 979.          Whether or not a trade name must be registered under the Fictitious Names Act of June 28, 1917, P. L. 645, as amended by tho Act of June 29, 1923, P. L. 979, is to be determined by ascertaining whether the name is "assumed," feigned," fictitious," "not real" or "not genuine." Unless a trade name may lie so classified it is not within tho Fictitious Names Act, even though it fails to identify precisely the individuals conducting the business.          A trade name containing the word ''company" will ordinarily be fictitious within the moaning of the Fictitious Names Act.          Honorable Richard J. Beamish,          Secretary of the Commonwealth,          Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.          Sir: You have asked us to construe the Act of June 28, 1917, P. L. 645, as last amended by the Act of June 29, 1923, P. L. 979, which is commonly known as the Fictitious Names Act. You wish us to furnish you with a guide which will enable you to determine whether particular business names should be registered under the act.          Every case, of course, must stand on its own facts, but there is a sufficient similarity among many of them that will permit us to state some guiding principles and to illustrate them with examples of common types of business names that are commonly used.          The act forbids any individual or individuals "to carry on or conduct any business in this Commonwealth under any assumed or fictitious name, style or designation" unless such name, style or designation shall have been registered with the Secretary of the Commonwealth and with the prothonotary of the county, in the manner therein prescribed.          In Engle v. Capital Fire Insurance Company, 76 Pa., Super. 390, 397, the Superior Court stated the purpose of the act as follows:
"The purpose of the statute * * * is to protect persons giving credit in reliance on the assumed or fictitious name, and to definitely establish the identity of the individuals owning the business, for the information of those who might have dealings with the concern. * * * It is a penal regulation and should be so construed as not to extend its operation beyond the purposes for which it was obviously enacted."
         This statement has been quoted with approval by...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT