Zachary D. Brien, Benton City Attorney
AGO OAG 19-11
No. OAG 19-011
Kentucky Attorney General Opinion
Commonwealth of Kentucky Office of the Attorney General
July 19, 2019
Subject:
Whether KRS 109.115(3)(a) applies to waste management
districts containing only one county; whether Mayor's
representative to the board delegated under KRS 109.H5(3)(a)
of a waste management district requires fiscal court approval
and who appoints other members; whether the Mayor may
delegate a representative under KRS 109.115(3)(b); whether
KRS 109.115(6) applies only to waste management districts of
consolidated local governments; whether a fiscal court can
appoint a successor to the board at any time.
Requested
by: Zachary D. Brien, Benton City Attorney
Written
by: Taylor Payne, Assistant Attorney General
Syllabus:
KRS 109.H5(3)(a) applies to a solid waste district containing
only one county; KRS 109.115 does not require fiscal court
approval of the mayor's delegate to a solid waste
management board, and the fiscal court appoints the other
members to the board; a mayor may not delegate a
representative to the board under KRS 109.H5(3)(b) because he
appoints a member to the board; KRS 109.H5(3)(6) only applies
to waste management districts of consolidated local
governments; a fiscal court with appointing authority under
KRS 109.H5(3)(a) may appoint a successor at any time up until
60 days after the expiration of the members' term, at
which point that member is reappointed to the board by
operation of KRS 65.008(2).
Statutes
construed: KRS 109.115; KRS 65.008
OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Zachary
D. Brien, City Attorney, City of Benton, Kentucky, requests
an opinion from this office to address questions regarding
appointments to and membership on a waste management district
("District"). The questions seek interpretation of
KRS 109.115 and KRS 65.008.
The
goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the
intent of the legislature. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ. v.
Fell, 391 S.W.3d 713, 718 (Ky. 2012) (citation omitted).
Courts accomplish this by assigning words used by the
legislature their literal meaning, unless doing so would lead
to an absurd result. Univ. of Louisville v.
Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Ky. 2017) (citation
omitted). In other words, courts "look first to the
plain language of a statute[.]" Id. (citation
omitted). If the legislature's intent can be ascertained
by the plain language, the court's inquiry ends without
resort to any other method or source. Id. (citation
omitted).
The
first five questions concern...
