VICTOR DIAZ CLAIMANT-APPELLEE
v.
CITY OF BRIDGEPORT SELF-INSURED EMPLOYER
and
PMA COMPANIES THIRD-PARTY ADMINISTRATOR RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS
No. 6333 CRB-4-19-6
Connecticut Workers Compensation
Compensation Review Board Workers Compensation Commission
April 29, 2020
This
Petition for Review from the May 21, 2019 Order of Jodi
Murray Gregg, Commissioner acting for the Fourth District,
was heard on November 22, 2019 before a Compensation Review
Board panel consisting of Commission Chairman Stephen M.
Morelli and Commissioners Peter C. Mlynarczyk and David W.
Schoolcraft.
The
claimant was represented by David J. Morrissey, Esq.,
Morrissey, Morrissey, Mooney & Rydzik, L L.C.
The
respondents were represented by Joseph J. Passaretti, Jr.,
Montstream Law Group
OPINION
STEPHEN M. MORELLI, CHAIRMAN.
The
respondents have petitioned for review from the May 21, 2019
Order (order) of Jodi Murray Gregg, Commissioner acting for
the Fourth District (commissioner). We find no error and
accordingly affirm the decision of the commissioner.[1]
The
commissioner made the following factual findings which are
pertinent to our review of this matter. A formal hearing was
held on April 15, 2019 in order to determine whether a
portion of the claimant’s permanent partial disability
award was eligible for commutation pursuant to the provisions
of General Statutes § 31-302.[2] In a prior Supplemental
Finding and Award dated January 30, 2019, the claimant had
been awarded 245 weeks of permanent partial disability
benefits at the weekly compensation rate of $551.13, with a
maximum medical improvement date of February 20,
2019.[3] The claimant subsequently requested
that the final 123 weeks of his 245-week award be commuted
into a lump sum. At the formal hearing, the claimant
testified that he understood that any commutation of his
award would be subject to a 3 percent actuarial reduction,
and that once the lump sum was paid, he would be deemed to
have been paid his full weekly rate for the weeks covered by
the commutation period.
The
claimant indicated that he was seeking a lump sum payment in
order to pay past-due property taxes and reduce his credit
card debt. The respondent municipality objected to the
commutation.
Following
the formal hearing, the commissioner concluded that the
claimant had demonstrated “good and sufficient
cause,” Conclusion, ¶ 1, for a commutation of his
permanent partial disability award. She granted the
commutation for the time period commencing on the
123rd week of the award and continuing until the
expiration of the 245th week. The commissioner
ordered the respondents to continue paying the
claimant’s weekly permanent partial disability benefits
until the expiration of the 122nd week, at which
time the January 31, 2019 Supplemental Finding and Award
would be satisfied. She also determined that the respondents
would have a moratorium against the payment of weekly
permanency benefits for the time period covered by the
commutation. In addition, she authorized the respondents to
discontinue the payment of weekly indemnity benefits after
the payment for the 122nd week without the
necessity of filing a notice to discontinue benefits
(“form 36”). Finally, she indicated that the
parties would receive a commutation order under separate
cover outlining the payments due to the claimant and the
discounts taken on the commuted amount.[4]
The
respondents filed an appeal petition along with a motion for
articulation and a motion to correct. Both motions were
denied; on appeal, the respondents challenge a
commissioner’s right to grant a commutation “off
the end” of an award of specific indemnity benefits,
i.e., to order prepayment of some final portion of a
permanency award while the claimant is still collecting
weekly benefits as they come due. As such, the respondents
contend that the commissioner’s decision to grant the
claimant’s request for a commutation of weeks 123
through 245 of his permanency award in the absence of a
moratorium for the first 122 weeks constituted an improper
application of the provisions of § 31-302. The
respondents also claim as error the commissioner’s
denial of their motion to correct and motion...