Diaz v. City of Bridgeport, 042920 CTWC, 6333 CRB-4-19-6

Case DateApril 29, 2020
CourtConnecticut
VICTOR DIAZ CLAIMANT-APPELLEE
v.
CITY OF BRIDGEPORT SELF-INSURED EMPLOYER
and
PMA COMPANIES THIRD-PARTY ADMINISTRATOR RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS
No. 6333 CRB-4-19-6
Connecticut Workers Compensation
Compensation Review Board Workers Compensation Commission
April 29, 2020
         This Petition for Review from the May 21, 2019 Order of Jodi Murray Gregg, Commissioner acting for the Fourth District, was heard on November 22, 2019 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of Commission Chairman Stephen M. Morelli and Commissioners Peter C. Mlynarczyk and David W. Schoolcraft.           The claimant was represented by David J. Morrissey, Esq., Morrissey, Morrissey, Mooney & Rydzik, L L.C.           The respondents were represented by Joseph J. Passaretti, Jr., Montstream Law Group          OPINION           STEPHEN M. MORELLI, CHAIRMAN.          The respondents have petitioned for review from the May 21, 2019 Order (order) of Jodi Murray Gregg, Commissioner acting for the Fourth District (commissioner). We find no error and accordingly affirm the decision of the commissioner.[1]          The commissioner made the following factual findings which are pertinent to our review of this matter. A formal hearing was held on April 15, 2019 in order to determine whether a portion of the claimant’s permanent partial disability award was eligible for commutation pursuant to the provisions of General Statutes § 31-302.[2] In a prior Supplemental Finding and Award dated January 30, 2019, the claimant had been awarded 245 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits at the weekly compensation rate of $551.13, with a maximum medical improvement date of February 20, 2019.[3] The claimant subsequently requested that the final 123 weeks of his 245-week award be commuted into a lump sum. At the formal hearing, the claimant testified that he understood that any commutation of his award would be subject to a 3 percent actuarial reduction, and that once the lump sum was paid, he would be deemed to have been paid his full weekly rate for the weeks covered by the commutation period.          The claimant indicated that he was seeking a lump sum payment in order to pay past-due property taxes and reduce his credit card debt. The respondent municipality objected to the commutation.          Following the formal hearing, the commissioner concluded that the claimant had demonstrated “good and sufficient cause,” Conclusion, ¶ 1, for a commutation of his permanent partial disability award. She granted the commutation for the time period commencing on the 123rd week of the award and continuing until the expiration of the 245th week. The commissioner ordered the respondents to continue paying the claimant’s weekly permanent partial disability benefits until the expiration of the 122nd week, at which time the January 31, 2019 Supplemental Finding and Award would be satisfied. She also determined that the respondents would have a moratorium against the payment of weekly permanency benefits for the time period covered by the commutation. In addition, she authorized the respondents to discontinue the payment of weekly indemnity benefits after the payment for the 122nd week without the necessity of filing a notice to discontinue benefits (“form 36”). Finally, she indicated that the parties would receive a commutation order under separate cover outlining the payments due to the claimant and the discounts taken on the commuted amount.[4]          The respondents filed an appeal petition along with a motion for articulation and a motion to correct. Both motions were denied; on appeal, the respondents challenge a commissioner’s right to grant a commutation “off the end” of an award of specific indemnity benefits, i.e., to order prepayment of some final portion of a permanency award while the claimant is still collecting weekly benefits as they come due. As such, the respondents contend that the commissioner’s decision to grant the claimant’s request for a commutation of weeks 123 through 245 of his permanency award in the absence of a moratorium for the first 122 weeks constituted an improper application of the provisions of § 31-302. The respondents also claim as error the commissioner’s denial of their motion to correct and motion...

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