Edens v. Brundage-Bone Concrete Pumping, 060716 IDWC, IC 2008-035062

Case DateJune 07, 2016
CourtIdaho
KELLY EDENS, Claimant,
v.
BRUNDAGE-BONE CONCRETE PUMPING, Employer,
and
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, Surety,
and
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY HOMESTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Surety, Defendants.
Nos. IC 2008-035062, 2014-004950, 2014-011138
Idaho Workers Compensation
Before the Industrial Commission of the state of Idaho
June 7, 2016
          FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER           R.D. Maynard, Chairman          INTRODUCTION          Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the above-entitled matter to Referee LaDawn Marsters, who conducted a hearing in Boise on November 19, 2014. Daniel J. Luker represented Claimant Kelly Edens. Joseph M. Wager represented Employer Brundage-Bone Concrete Plumbing ("Brundage-Bone") and Surety Liberty Mutual Insurance Corp. ("Liberty"). Nathan T. Gamel represented Employer Brundage-Bone and Surety Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Insurance Company ("Berkshire"). The Referee admitted oral and documentary evidence at the hearing. The parties took post-hearing depositions. On July 9, 2015, Referee Marsters granted Claimant's motion to receive additional evidence regarding his right shoulder condition and scheduled a second hearing. Prior to the second hearing, Referee Marsters left the Commission. The Commission reassigned the matter to Referee Alan Taylor, who conducted a hearing in Boise on September 18, 2015. The same legal counsel represented the parties at the second hearing. The Referee admitted additional oral and documentary evidence into the record. The parties took additional post-hearing depositions and submitted post-hearing briefs. The matter came under advisement on March 8, 2016. The undersigned Commissioners have chosen not to adopt the Referee's recommendation and hereby issue their own findings of fact, conclusions of law and order. The Commissioners agree with the Referee's proposed outcome, but give slightly different treatment to the question of whether the risk of injury to which Claimant was exposed was "characteristic of and peculiar to" his employment.          ISSUES          The issues to be decided are as follows:          1. Whether the condition for which Claimant seeks benefits was caused by the 2008 industrial accident, the result of work activity in 2014, neither, or some combination of both;          2. Whether Claimant incurred a compensable occupational disease;          3. Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a preexisting injury/condition;          4. Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to the following benefits:          a. Medical care; and          b. Temporary partial and/or temporary total disability benefits (TPD/TTD);          5. Whether Claimant's shoulder injury is compensable, including his entitlement to medical and temporary disability benefits related to that injury.          6. All other issues are reserved.          CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES          On October 27, 2008, Claimant sustained injuries while working for Brundage-Bone on the deck of an interstate bridge that collapsed (the "2008 industrial accident"). At the time of the 2008 industrial accident, Liberty provided the worker's compensation insurance coverage for Brundage-Bone. Liberty accepted the claim, covered Claimant's medical bills, and paid both time-loss and impairment benefits associated with the accident. Claimant received a release to return to work without restrictions and he returned to work full-time for Brundage-Bone. On November 1, 2013, Berkshire became the Surety for Brundage-Bone. Claimant continued to work for Brundage-Bone until February 10, 2014, when he had an onset of pain in his upper extremities while unloading concrete hose line from his truck (the "2014 industrial accident"). Claimant sought medical treatment and has not worked for Brundage-Bone since. Neither Surety has accepted responsibility for Claimant's medical conditions or treatment following the 2014 industrial accident.          Claimant alleges that his work activities on February 10, 2014 constituted a new accident resulting in the onset of bilateral cubital tunnel syndrome ("CTS") and a SLAP tear to his right shoulder. In the alternative, he argues that his bilateral CTS is a compensable occupational disease incurred as a result of his employment with Brundage-Bone. Claimant argues that the medical treatment he has received for both his bilateral CTS and his right shoulder condition, which have included surgeries, are reasonable and causally related to the 2014 industrial accident. He asserts that Defendants are liable to pay the full invoiced amounts of his medical bills. He further asserts that he is entitled to temporary disability benefits since February 10, 2014 because, as of the date of the second hearing, he was still in a period of recovery. Finally, in the alternative, Claimant argues that if the Commission does not find that the 2014 industrial accident is the most probable cause of his bilateral CTS and his right shoulder condition, then those conditions are the result of his 2008 industrial accident and are still compensable.          Liberty argues that Claimant has not met his burden of proving that his bilateral CTS and right shoulder condition are causally related to the 2008 industrial accident. Thus, Liberty argues that it bears no financial responsibility for those conditions and is not liable for any time loss or medical benefits.          Berkshire argues that there is no medical testimony demonstrating that the 2014 industrial incident caused Claimant's bilateral CTS. Berkshire further argues that Claimant's occupational disease claim for bilateral CTS fails because no physician has offered medical testimony sufficient to satisfy the "peculiarity" element of proof necessary for a compensable occupational disease claim. As for Claimant's right shoulder condition, Berkshire argues that Claimant has failed to sustain his burden of proof that it is causally related to the 2014 industrial incident. Thus, Berkshire argues that it bears no financial responsibility for those conditions and it is not liable for any time loss or medical benefits.          EVIDENCE CONSIDERED          The record in this matter consists of the following:          1. The testimony of Claimant and his wife Rebecca Edens taken at the November 19, 2014 hearing;          2. The testimony of Claimant taken at the September 18, 2015 hearing;          3. Claimant's Exhibits 1 – 34, Volume I ("CEI") admitted at the November 19, 2014 hearing;          4. Claimant's Exhibits 1 – 21, Volume II ("CEII") admitted at the September 18, 2015 hearing;          5. Defendant Berkshire's Exhibits 1 – 18 ("BE") admitted at the November 19, 2014 hearing;          6. Defendant Liberty's Exhibits 1, 2, 9, and 10 ("LE") admitted at the November 19, 2014 hearing;          7. The deposition transcript of Claimant taken on November 7, 2014;          8. The deposition transcript of David N. Price, DC, taken on January 20, 2015;          9. The deposition transcript of Kevin Krafft, M.D., taken on January 23, 2015;          10. The telephonic deposition transcript of Lance LeClere, M.D., taken on March 19, 2015;          11. The deposition transcript of Jeffrey G. Hessing, M.D., taken on October 2, 2015; and          12. The deposition transcript of Lance LeClere, M.D., taken on October 13, 2015.          OBJECTIONS          All pending objections are overruled, with the exception of the objection to admission of Exhibit 1 offered by Berkshire during the deposition of Dr. LeClere on October 13, 2015, at page 23, lines 8 to 19. Berkshire did not provide notice of the exhibit in compliance with Rule 10(c) of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure, nor was the exhibit in existence at the time of hearing. The objection is sustained.           FINDINGS OF FACT          1. Claimant's Background. Claimant was born in 1969. He moved with his family to Idaho in 1979. He attended high school until the ninth grade and later obtained his GED. Prior to his work for Brundage-Bone, his employment history consisted primarily of work in the restaurant and construction industries. He was 46 years old, married and resided in Nampa at the time of the second hearing. Claimant's Dep., 20:2-21; 31:23-36:8.          2. Brundage-Bone. Brundage-Bone operates a concrete pumping service business. It employs concrete pump operators who use concrete pump...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT