Fasano, 013117 CTAGO, AGO 2017-1

• Case Date: January 31, 2017
• Court: Connecticut

Hon. Leonard A. Fasano AGO 2017-1 No. 2017-01 Connecticut Attorney General Opinions Office of the Attorney General State of Connecticut January 31, 2017          Hon. Leonard A. Fasano          Senate Republican President Pro Tempore          Legislative Office Building          300 Capitol Avenue, Suite 3400          Hartford, CT 06106-1591          Dear Senator Fasano:          You have requested an opinion on the requirements of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 3-125a, which provides that the General Assembly may reject a settlement agreement by a "three-fifths vote of each house." Specifically, you inquire whether, in considering the proposed Revised Exit Plan for the Juan F. v. Malloy federal litigation, the supermajority requirement of § 3-125a is calculated on the basis of members present and voting. We conclude that the answer is "yes."          Section 3-125a provides:

Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (h) of section 4-160, the Attorney General shall not enter into any agreement or stipulation in connection with a lawsuit to which the state is a party that contains any provision which requires an expenditure from the General Fund budget in an amount in excess of two million five hundred thousand dollars over the term of the agreement or stipulation, unless the General Assembly, by resolution, accepts the terms of such provision. The General Assembly may reject such provision by a three-fifths vote of each house. Such provision shall be deemed approved if the General Assembly fails to vote to approve or reject such provision within thirty days of the date of submittal pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 3-125a(a) (emphasis added).          Both the Connecticut Constitution and various other statutes include supermajority voting requirements for legislative actions. These requirements generally are expressed in one of two ways: first, provisions that require a supermajority vote "of each house;" e.g., Conn. Const, art. Fourth, § 18 (gubernatorial incapacity, "two-thirds vote of each house"); Conn. Const, art. Fifth, § 2 (removal of judges, "on the address of two-thirds of each house"); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 5-278 (collective bargaining agreements and arbitration awards, rejected by "two-thirds vote of either house"); and second, provisions that require a supermajority vote of the "members" or "membership" of each house. E.g., Conn. Const, art. Third, § 6 (reapportionment, "vote of at least two-thirds of the membership of each house"); Conn. Const, art. Third, § 18 (spending cap, "vote of three-fifths of the members of each house"); Conn. Const, art. Fourth, § 15 (veto, "two-thirds vote of the members of each house"); Conn. Const, art. Twelfth (constitutional amendments, "vote of at least three-fourths of the total membership of each house," and "vote of at...