Goodnough, 111631 PAAGO, AGO 32

• Case Date: November 16, 1931
• Court: Pennsylvania

Honorable C. J. Goodnough AGO 32 Opinion No. 32 Pennsylvania Attorney General Opinions Opinions Of The Attorney General November 16, 1931          Legislature—House of Representatives—Constitutionality of House Bills Nos. 1 to 30 Inclusive, Extraordinarily Session of 1931—Art. VI, Sec. 12; Art. Ill. See. 25 of the Constitution.          The Attorney General advises the Speaker of the House of Representatives regarding the constitutionality of House Bills Nos. 1 to 30 inclusive, Extraordinary Session of 1931. Honorable C. J. Goodnough,          Speaker of the House of Representatives,          Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.          Sir: I have the request of the House of Representatives, communicated to me through a certified copy of its resolution of November 10, asking me to supply to it my opinion as to the constitutionality of each bill presented at the present Extraordinary Session within one week after its introduction. Subject to a reservation which I shall state at the conclusion of this communication, it will give me great pleasure to comply with the request.          The provisions of the Constitution applying to Extraordinary Sessions of the General Assembly appear in Article IV, Section 12, and Article III, Section 25. They are:

Article JV, Section 12: "He [the Governor] may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the General Assembly. * * * He shall have power to convene the Senate in extraordinary session by proclamation for the transaction of executive business."

Article III, Section 25; "When the General Assembly shall be convened in special session, there shall be no legislation upon subjects other than those designated in the proclamation of the Governor calling such session."

         These constitutional provisions have been construed by our appellate courts in a number of cases; and it will be helpful, I am sure, to review these cases before dealing with the constitutionality of the bills thus far introduced.          Pittsburg's Petition, 217 Pa. 227, was decided in 1907, following the Special Session of the Legislature held in 1906.          Governor Pennypacker called the Special Session by Proclamation dated November 11, 1905, to convene on January 15, 1906. In his proclamation, the Governor specified seven subjects which he asked the Legislature to consider. The first subject was:          "To enable contiguous cities in the same counties to be united in one municipality in order that the people may avoid the unnecessary burdens of maintaining separate city governments."          On January 9, 1906, the Governor issued a second proclamation adding four subjects to the list contained in the original proclamation. The fourth was as follows:

"To enable cities that are now or may hereafter be contiguous or in close proximity, including any intervening land, to be united in one municipality, in order that the people may avoid the unnecessary burdens of maintaining separate municipal governments. This fourth subject is a modification of the first subject in the original call, and is added in order that legislation may be enacted under either of them, as may be deemed wise."

         It will be noted that in this subject certain words of the first subject of the original call were omitted, and other words were added. The omitted words were "in the same counties." Among those added were, "or in close proximity, including any intervening land."          The Legislature passed the Act of February 7, 1906, P. L. 7, entitled "An act to enable cities that now are, or may hereafter be, contiguous or in close proximity, to be united, with any intervening land other than boroughs, in one municipality; * * *."          Under this act the cities of Pittsburgh and Allegheny were consolidated by the Court of Quarter Sessions of Allegheny County. Prom the consolidation decree an appeal was taken to the Superior Court, and subsequently from that Court to the Supreme Court. Both appellate courts sustained the decree.          The first contention of the appellants was that the Act of 1906 was unconstitutional because it was not legislation upon a subject designated in the proclamation of the Governor calling the Special Session. The Supreme Court held that while the act did not come within subject "First" of the original proclamation, it did come within subject "Fourth" of the supplemental proclamation, and that the Governor's supplemental proclamation had validly enlarged the scope of legislative action at the Special Session.          In speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Brown said, at page 230:

"In the original proclamation the legislation to be considered by the general assembly on the subject of the consolidation of cities was confined to contiguous cities in the same county, and it may well be contended that, as the numdate of the constitution is imperative that the legislature, at the special session, shall pass no law upon any subject not designated in the call, the act is technically without it. The act is not for the consolidation of two contiguous cities, situated in the same county, but for that of any two, contiguous or in close proximity, wherever situated. They may be in different counties. We need not, however, pass upon the sufficiency of the first proclamation to sustain the act as being one of the subjects of legislation designated in it.

""Whether the general assembly ought to be called together in extraordinary session is always a matter for the executive alone. How it shall be called, and what notice of the call is to be given, are also for him alone. The constitution is silent as to these matters, and wisely so, for emergencies may arise * * * requiring the instant convening of the legislature, and, in the power given to the governor to call it, no time for the notice is too short, if it can reach the members of the general assembly; * * * no form of proclamation is to be followed, and if, after one has been issued, it occurs to the executive that other subjects than those designated in it should be passed upon by the legislature, he can unquestionably issue another, fixing the same time for the meeting of the general assembly as was fixed in the first, and designate other subjects for its consideration. * * * The proclamation of January 9 is in effect a second proclamation. * * * It would be judicial hypercriticism to declare his second notice or proclamation insufficient to authorize the legislature to pass the act under consideration."

         In Liking's Petition (No. 1), 223 Pa. 456, Governor Pennypacker's call for the Special Session of 1906 was again before the courts. On this occasion the Act of March 6, 1906, P. L. 78, was challenged as legislation not...