Kuehn, 032118 NEAGO, AGO 18-1
Case Date | March 21, 2018 |
Court | Nebraska |
First, does the payment of property taxes to a local government as a means of foregoing a state income tax liability represent a commutation of taxes, which is prohibited by Article VIII Section 4 of the Nebraska Constitution?
Second, the receipt of a refundable income tax credit based on a proportion of property taxes paid favors only those who file a Nebraska income tax return, not all property tax payers. Is this preferential treatment for Nebraska income tax filers over non-resident property tax payers facially discriminatory on the basis of the Commerce Clause and/or Dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution?ANALYSIS A. Commutation of Taxes. Neb. Const, art. VIII, § 4, provides, in pertinent part:
Except as to tax and assessment charges against real property remaining delinquent and unpaid for a period of fifteen years or longer, the Legislature shall have no power to release or discharge any county, city, township, town, or district whatever, or the inhabitants thereof, or any corporation, or the property therein, from their or its proportionate share of taxes to be levied for state purposes, or due any municipal corporation, nor shall commutation for such taxes be authorized in any form whatever...."The proscription against commuting a tax prevents the Legislature from releasing either persons or property from contributing a proportionate share of the tax." Sarpy County Farm Bureau v. Learning Community of Douglas and Sarpy Ctys., 283 Neb. 212, 244, 808 N.W.2d 598, 621 (2012). In Steinacher v. Swanson, 131 Neb. 439, 268 N.W. 317 (1936), the Nebraska Supreme Court held an act which allowed delinquent property taxes to be paid in installments violated the prohibition against the commutation of taxes in art. VIII, § 4. The Steinacher court noted the definition of "commutation" expressed in Woodrough v. Douglas County, 71 Neb. 354, 361, 98 N.W. 1092, 1095 (1904):
Commutation is a passing from one state to another; an alteration, a change; the act of substituting one thing for another; a substitution of one sort of payment for another, or of a money payment in lieu of a performance of a compulsory duty or labor or of a single payment in lieu of a number of successive payments, usually at a reduced rate. 131 Neb. at 445-46, 268 N.W. at 321.Further addressing the meaning of the prohibition against the commutation of taxes in art. VIII, § 4, the Court in Steinacher stated:
It is quite apparent that the framers of the Constitution of 1875, the one first containing this provision, and the members of all subsequent constitutional conventions, have been imbued with the idea that all taxpayers are entitled to the same treatment by the government they support. For this reason they have expressly written into our Constitution that the legislature not only shall have no power to release or discharge any one from the payment of his share of taxes, but a commutation for taxes in any form whatever is prohibited. From an examination of the definitions of the word "commutation" herein before set out, and the use of the words "in any form whatever," contained in our constitutional provision, it is quite apparent that the legislature is prohibited by the Constitution from changing the method of payment of any tax once levied. Clearly, under this constitutional provision, the legislature cannot reduce the amount of the tax, extend the time for payment, or in any manner change the method of payment. 131 Neb. at 446, 268 N.W. at 321 (emphasis in original).Thus, the prohibition against "commutation" means that the "legislature is prohibited by the Constitution from changing the method of payment of any tax once levied." Steinacher v. Swanson, 131 Neb. at 446, 268 N.W. at 321. See also Woodrough v. Douglas County (Act which allowed delinquent taxpayers to pay in installments violated the prohibition against commutation for taxes). In Banks v. Heineman, 286 Neb. 390, 837 N.W.2d 70 (2013), the Court addressed for the first time the issue of whether the prohibition against the "commutation" of taxes applied to taxes other than property taxes. At issue was whether the "nameplate capacity tax," an excise tax measured by the production capacity of wind generation facilities, operated to commute taxes in violation of art. VIII, § 4. The Court noted that "[t]he language of article VIII, § 4, does not prohibit the release, discharge, or commutation of 'taxes,' but, rather, a taxpayer's 'proportionate share' of taxes . . . ." This language "correlates with the requirement of Neb. Const. Art. VIII, § 1, that taxes be levied by valuation uniformly and...
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