Lepage v. Arlington County Arlington County, 031221 VAWC, VA02000032277

Case DateMarch 12, 2021
CourtVirginia
PAXTON LEPAGE
v.
ARLINGTON COUNTY ARLINGTON COUNTY, Insurance Carrier
HELMSMAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES, Claim Administrator
Jurisdiction Claim No. VA02000032277
Claim Administrator File No. 80DE74718
Virginia Workers’ Compensation
Virginia In The Workers’ Compensation Commission
March 12, 2021
          Date of Injury: July 18, 2018           James E. Swiger, Esquire For the Claimant.           Ryan Samuel, Esquire For the Defendant.           REVIEW on the record by Commissioner Marshall, Commissioner Newman, and Commissioner Rapaport at Richmond, Virginia.           OPINION           RAPAPORT Commissioner          The defendant requests review of the Deputy Commissioner’s September 25, 2020 Opinion finding the claimant suffered post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) as a compensable ordinary disease of life. We AFFIRM.          I. Material Proceedings          On April 11, 2019, the claimant filed a Claim for Benefits alleging he suffered PTSD as an occupational disease with a date of diagnosis of July 18, 2018. The claimant sought medical benefits and temporary total disability benefits from January 15, 2019 through March 8, 2019.          The parties agreed the claimant earned a pre-injury average weekly wage of $1,359.67. The defendant agreed to the period of disability claimed, subject to their defenses.          The defendant defended the claim on the grounds the claimant did not suffer an occupational disease or a compensable ordinary disease of life arising out of his employment.          Deputy Commissioner Plunkett conducted an evidentiary hearing on July 2, 2020. The parties also submitted post-hearing position statements to address the case law and uncontested facts of the case.          On September 25, 2020, Deputy Commissioner Plunkett held the claimant suffered a compensable ordinary disease of life of PTSD, pursuant to Virginia Code § 65.2-401. She found the claimant’s credible testimony and the medical evidence established his PTSD was caused by multiple stressful events in his work as a firefighter paramedic. She credited the opinions of Drs. Singh and Morris, the claimant’s treating psychiatrists. She awarded medical benefits, pursuant to Virginia Code § 65.2-603, and temporary total disability benefits from January 15, 2019 through March 8, 2019, based on the parties’ stipulation.          The defendant requests review of the Deputy Commissioner’s decision.[1] The defendant maintains the medical evidence does not establish the claimant has PTSD, and, in the alternative, the medical evidence is not clear and convincing that causes outside of his employment did not contribute to his PTSD.          II. Findings of Fact and Rulings of Law          Virginia Code § 65.2-401 provides, in pertinent part, that:
An ordinary disease of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment may be treated as an occupational disease for purposes of this title if each of the following elements is established by clear and convincing evidence, (not a mere probability):
1. That the disease exists and arose out of and in the course of employment as provided in § 65.2-400 with respect to occupational diseases and did not result from causes outside of the employment, and
2. That one of the following exists:
a. It follows as an incident of occupational disease as defined in this title; or
b. It is an infectious or contagious disease contracted in the course of one’s employment in a hospital or sanitarium or laboratory or nursing home as defined in § 32.1-123, or while otherwise engaged in the direct delivery of health care, or in the course of employment as emergency rescue personnel and those volunteer emergency rescue personnel referred to in § 65.2-101; or
c. It is characteristic of the employment and was caused by conditions peculiar to such employment.
         “Clear and convincing evidence” has been defined as follows:
[T]hat measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not mean clear and unequivocal.
Lanning v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 37 Va.App. 701, 706-07 (2002) (citing Nat’l Fruit Prod. Co. v. Staton, 28 Va.App. 650, 654 (1998)). The claimant has the burden to prove all the elements of Virginia Code § 65.2-401, including that the disease did not result from causes outside of his employment. See Steadman v. Liberty Fabrics, 41 Va.App. 796, 806 (2003).          We agree with the Deputy Commissioner’s decision.[2] The evidence in the record is sufficient to meet the claimant’s burden of proof he suffers from compensable PTSD, pursuant to Virginia Code § 65.2-401.          At the hearing, the claimant, a firefighter/EMT for the employer since August 2008, testified he had a May 2018 incident at work in which he lost...

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