DANIEL E. LUNGREN Attorney General
MAXINE P. CUTLER Deputy Attorney General
AGO 94-1208
No. 94-1208
California Attorney General Opinion
Office of the Attorney General State of California
May 30, 1995
THE
HONORABLE FRED AGUIAR, MEMBER OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY, has
requested an opinion on the following questions:
1. May
law enforcement officers be compensated under the victims of
crime program for injuries sustained while performing
official duties?
2. If
law enforcement officers may be compensated under the victims
of crime program, are their claims to be treated differently
from the claims of other victims?
CONCLUSIONS
1. Law
enforcement officers may be compensated under the victims of
crime program for injuries sustained while performing
official duties.
2.
Under the victims of crime program, the claims of law
enforcement officers are not to be treated differently from
the claims of other victims.
ANALYSIS
The
California Victims of Crime Act (Gov. Code, §§
13959-13969.3; "Act")
[1] was enacted in part to
provide monetary assistance when residents of California
suffer injury or death as a direct result of criminal
conduct. (§ 13960, subd. (a).) The program is
administered by the State Board of Control
("Board"), which is directed to approve
compensation applications "if a preponderance of the
evidence shows that as a direct result of the crime, the
victim or a derivative victim incurred an injury which
resulted in a pecuniary loss." (§
13964.)
2 Claims are paid from a restitution
fund containing fines assessed against criminal defendants.
(§ 13969; see 77 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 180, 181, fn. 2
(1994).) The two questions presented for resolution concern
applications for compensation filed with the Board by law
enforcement officers.
1.
Eligibility of Law Enforcement Officers
We are
first asked whether law enforcement officers injured while
performing official duties may receive benefits under the Act
for injuries sustained. We conclude that they may recover for
their pecuniary loss in such circumstances.
In
analyzing this question, we may rely upon several principles
of statutory interpretation. "In construing a statute,
our principal task is to ascertain the intent of the
Legislature." (Yoshisato v. Superior
Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 978, 989.) "We do so by
first turning to the words themselves, giving them their
ordinary meaning. [Citations.]" (People v.
Broussard (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1067, 1071.)
"'[W]hen statutory language is . . . clear and
unambiguous there is no need for construction . . .
.'" (Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52
Cal.3d 65, 73.) A "'court has no power to rewrite
the statute so as to make it conform to a presumed
intention which is not expressed' . . . [also,] [t]he
sweep of a statute should not be enlarged by insertion of
language which the Legislature has overtly left out . . .
." (People v. Branno (1973) 32
Cal.App.3d 971, 977; see also Wells Fargo Bank v.
Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1082, 1097.) "When
the Legislature 'has employed a term or phrase in one
place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied
where excluded.' ..." (Pasadena Police Officers
Assn. v. City of Pasadena (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564,
576.)
The
declared purposes of the Act are stated in section 13959,
which provides:
"It
is in the public interest to assist residents of the State
of California in obtaining restitution for the pecuniary
losses they suffer as a direct result of criminal acts.
This article shall govern the procedure by which crime
victims may obtain restitution through compensation from
the Restitution Fund."
The
term "victim" for purposes of the Act is...
