Murray, 082517 ARWC, G200364

• Case Date: August 25, 2017
• Court: Kansas

WILLIAM MURRAY, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT SALINE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, SELF-INSURED EMPLOYER RESPONDENT RISK MANAGEMENT RESOURCES, THIRD-PARTY ADMINISTRATOR RESPONDENT WCC No. G200364 Arkansas Workers Compensation Before the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission August 25, 2017          Hearing before Administrative Law Judge O. Milton Fine II on August 17, 2017 in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.           Claimant, pro se.           Respondents represented by Mr. Guy Alton Wade, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.           O. MILTON FINE, II Administrative Law Judge.          I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE          Introduction.          This matter comes before the Commission on Respondents’ motion to dismiss. A hearing on the motion was conducted on August 17, 2017 in Little Rock, Arkansas. Claimant, who is pro se, appeared in person and testified. His wife, Carol Murray, testified as well. Respondents were represented at the hearing by Mr. Guy Alton Wade, Attorney at Law, of Little Rock, Arkansas. In addition to Claimant’s testimony, the record consists of the Commission’s file–which, without objection, has been incorporated herein in its entirety by reference. Also admitted into evidence was Respondents’ Exhibit 1, correspondence, pleadings and orders related to this claim, consisting of 26 numbered pages.          Procedural History.          The first hearing on this claim took place on December 27, 2013. The January 17, 2017 opinion thereon contains the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:          1. The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission has jurisdiction over this claim.          2. The stipulations set forth [below] are reasonable and are hereby accepted[:]

A. The employee/self-insured employer relationship existed on or about June 12, 2010, when Claimant sustained a compensable injury to his head and left eye.

B. Respondents accepted the claim as compensable and paid benefits pursuant thereto.

C. Claimant’s average weekly wage of $628.00 entitled him to compensation rates of $419.00/$314.00.

         3. The evidence does not preponderate that Claimant is entitled to a permanent impairment rating of any amount in connection with his compensable eye injury.          4. Claimant has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to a controverted attorney’s fee.          Claimant appealed. On April 29, 2014, the Full Commission, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed and adopted the above findings and conclusions. See William Murray v. Saline Memorial Hosp., AWCC No. G200364 (Full Commission Opinion filed April 29, 2014). This decision is binding on this proceeding under the Law of the Case Doctrine and is res judicata. See Thurman v. Clarke Industries, Inc., 45 Ark.App. 87, 872 S.W.2d 418 (1994).          The evidence reflects that no further action was taken on the claim until December 15, 2014, when Respondents moved for its dismissal. The file was reassigned to me on December 16, 2014; and on that date, I wrote Claimant’s then-counsel, Steven McNeely, requesting a response to the motion within 15 days. He did so on December 29, 2014, writing: “I object to respondents [sic] motion to dismiss. Claimant has a compensable eye injury that respondents remain responsible for.” A hearing on the motion was ultimately scheduled for February 5, 2015. The hearing took place as scheduled before Administrative Law Judge Andrew Blood. During that hearing, Respondents specified (as reflected in the proposed order that had accompanied the filing of the motion) that the motion to dismiss was grounded in both Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702(a)(4) (Repl. 2012) and AWCC R. 099.13. In an opinion issued that same day, Judge Blood denied the motion, finding:          8. The evidence fails to preponderate that this claim should be dismissed for want of prosecution, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702(a)(4) or Rule 099.13 of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission.          Respondents did not appeal this decision. Consequently, it is likewise res judicata and the Law of the Case here. See supra.          The evidence reflects that no further action took place with respect to this claim until March 31, 2017, when Respondents filed another motion to dismiss. Again, the pleading was grounded in § 11-9-702(a)(4) and Rule 13. The file was again assigned to me on that same date; and I wrote McNeely at that time, asking for a response to the motion within 15 days. He did so on April 14, 2017, objecting to the dismissal...