No. 01406900 (2003). EMPLOYEE: Pasquale Pezzulo.
Case Date | December 30, 2003 |
Court | Massachusetts |
Massachusetts Workers Compensation
2003.
No. 01406900 (2003).
EMPLOYEE: Pasquale Pezzulo
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENTS EMPLOYEE: Pasquale
Pezzulo EMPLOYER: City of Salem
Self-insurer: City of Salem
BOARD NO. 01406900REVIEWING BOARD DECISION (Judges Costigan, Maze-Rothstein and Carroll)APPEARANCES
Donald E. Wallace, Esq., for the employee
Kevin T. Daly, Esq., for the self-insurer
COSTIGAN, J. The self-insurer accepted
liability for the employee's 1986 industrial injury [1] and paid him weekly
incapacity benefits, without interruption, for almost fourteen years, always at
the rate to which he was entitled for temporary total incapacity under G. L. c.
152, § 34. [2]
On April 28, 2000, the self-insurer unilaterally terminated those
payments, citing, on the incorrect departmental form, [3] the sole reason that
the employee had exhausted the statutory maximum payable for temporary total
incapacity, [4] which indeed he had. That event, however, had occurred on June
4, 1991, when Mr. Pezzulo reached the 260-week limit for § 34 benefits
applicable to his date of injury. (Dec. 2, 4.) It is not disputed that the City
continued to pay the employee weekly incapacity benefits at the same rate for
another eight years and eleven months, during which time,
[h]e picked up his checks every week at the personnel office at
Salem City Hall. No one ever questioned his entitlement to these checks. No one
suggested that the employee should return to work. No light duty jobs were
offered.
(Dec. 4.)
After his benefits were terminated, the employee filed a claim
for permanent and total incapacity benefits under § 34A, and applicable
cost-of-living adjustments under § 34B, from and after June 5, 1991. In
the alternative, he claimed temporary partial incapacity benefits under §
35, and applicable COLA benefits under § 35F, from and after April 29,
2000. He also claimed medical benefits under §§ 13 and 30, a penalty
under § 8(5) [5] for the self-insurer's alleged illegal discontinuance of
compensation, § 14 penalties for the self-insurer's alleged unreasonable
defense of his claim, [6] and interest under § 50. (Dec. 1-2.)
In the hearing decision which the employee's appeal brings to our
review, the administrative judge denied the employee's § 8(5) penalty
claim, finding that "[p]ursuant to Section 8(2)(g), the City was permitted to
terminate the weekly payments because the employee's entitlement to benefits
under Section 34 had been exhausted." (Dec. 11.) The judge adopted the opinions
of the § 11A impartial medical examiner and the self-insurer's medical
expert, [7] and found that
the employee has fallen far short of establishing that he is
permanently and totally incapacitated from substantial gainful employment as a
result of his June 1986 work injury . . . [W]ere it not for his vision problems
and the residual difficulties relating to his heart condition, the employee
would have been capable of working at any number of occupations. At a minimum,
he has been able to earn the minimum wage, which presently translates to about
$250.00 per week. At the time his Section 34 benefits exhausted, the minimum
wage was roughly $170.00 per week. As of June 5, 1991, he would have been
entitled to Section 35 benefits at the rate of $130.52 per week.
(Dec. 10-11.) The judge, however, did not award the employee
§ 35 partial incapacity benefits. He found that § 35E, [8]
affirmatively raised by the self-insurer in defense of the employee's claim,
barred payment of temporary partial incapacity benefits to the employee. The
judge was not persuaded that the employee, whose pension rights would have
vested in 1990 at the latest but perhaps earlier, (Dec. 12-13), "would have
remained active in the labor market at any time after his entitlement to
Section 34 benefits expired, on June 5 [sic], 1991." (Dec. 12.) The judge
denied and dismissed all of the employee's claims. [9] Because we agree with
the employee that the administrative judge erred in finding no illegal
discontinuance of benefits, we reverse the decision in that regard. We first
take issue with the judge's finding that "[t]he City paid the employee Section
34 benefits at the rate of $243.85 until April 28, 2000, nearly nine years
after his statutory right to those benefits expired." (Dec. 11.) By operation
of statute, the employee could not receive more than 260 weeks of § 34
benefits. "The total number of weeks of compensation due the employee under
this section shall not exceed two hundred and sixty." G. L. c.
152, § 34, as appearing in St. 1985, c. 572, § 42. (Emphasis added.)
The word "shall" is plain and unambiguous; it is mandatory, not precatory. See
Taylor's Case, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 495, 499 (1998); Hashimi v. Kalil, 388 Mass.
607, 609-610 (1983). There is no statutory provision which authorizes either
party, or both, or an administrative judge, to extend the 260-week limit on
payment of § 34 benefits. The parties stipulated that the 260-week period
ended on June 4, 1991. (Dec. 2.) Therefore, the weekly incapacity benefits,
which the self-insurer continued to pay after that date, could not have been...
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