OAG 81-51.
Case Date | June 24, 1981 |
Court | Oregon |
Oregon Attorney General Opinions
1981.
OAG 81-51.
527OPINION NO. 81-51[41 Or. Op. Atty. Gen. 527]No. 8039June 24, 1981The Honorable Robert SmithState
Senator
FIRST
QUESTION PRESENTEDDo the amendments to ORCP 32G(2) and (3)
and 32N, reflected in ORCP 32F(2) and (3) and 32L as submitted by the Council
on Court Procedures, amount to the deletion of a prohibition against so-called
"fluid recovery" in class actions?ANSWER GIVENThe amendments remove certain procedural obstacles to "fluid
recovery." They do not authorize fluid recovery.SECOND QUESTION PRESENTEDIf the answer to the
first
528question presented is yes, do the amendments to ORCP 32 as submitted by
the Council on Court Procedures exceed the Council's rulemaking authority under
ORS 1.735 in that they "abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of
any litigant"?ANSWER GIVENNo. THIRD QUESTION PRESENTEDDoes new ORCP 32F(4) as submitted by the Council on Court
Procedures, which provides that the court may require the defendant in a class
action to bear some or all of the costs of post-certification notice to class
members after a preliminary hearing on the defendant's liability, exceed the
Council's rulemaking authority under ORS 1.735 in that it may "abridge, enlarge
or modify the substantive rights of any litigant"?ANSWER GIVENYes.FOURTH QUESTION PRESENTEDIf any of the above
amendments to ORCP 32 do exceed the rulemaking authority of the Council on
Court Procedures under ORS 1.735, does the amended rule nevertheless take
effect 90 days after adjournment absent affirmative action by the
legislature?ANSWER GIVEN No.
INTRODUCTION
In the analysis of these questions, it is important to note the
structure of the Council on Court Procedures, the history of its formation, and
the relationship between the council and the Legislative Assembly.
For decades before establishment of the council in 1977,
scholars, judges and practitioners had criticized both the archaic nature of
the existing Oregon Code of Civil Procedure - virtually unchanged since the
Deady Code - and the unsystematic and piecemeal method of its amendment through
the legislative process.(fn1) The Council on Court Procedures was created to
consider and implement systematic reform.
Accordingly, the Council on Court Procedures (council) has the
duty to review and revise the rules governing civil procedure in Oregon trial
courts. ORS 1.725 - 1.750. Under ORS 1.745, all previous statutes on civil
procedure are now deemed rules of court. The council is authorized under ORS
1.735 to promulgate new rules, which may modify, supersede or repeal the
previous laws.
At least three distinct mechanisms constrain the discretion of
the council. First, the rules, by whatever means promulgated, must comply with
constitutional restrictions on their content and process of formulation.
Second, the council's statutory mandate declares that the proposed rules are to
regulate only "practice and procedure," and may 529not "abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any
litigant." ORS 1.735. Third, the rules promulgated by the council must be
presented to the Legislative Assembly, and take effect 90 days after the
adjournment sine die of the Assembly. ORS 1.735. It is
explicit in the structure of this process that the legislature, by law, may
ratify, amend or repeal any such rule before its effective date. It is implicit
in this scheme that the legislature is not restricted to reviewing whether the
council's rules are within the scope of its delegated authority to enact rules
of "practice and procedure." The Legislative Assembly may alter the council's
determination based upon its view that a proposed rule might abridge, enlarge
or modify a substantive right, or simply that the council's proposal is not
consistent with the Legislative Assembly's view of sound public policy relating
to court procedure. Legislative authority in this regard is plenary, limited
only by federal and state Constitutions, and by whatever might ultimately be
determined to be state constitutional constraints on the legislature's ability
to prescribe the internal procedures of the judicial branch of government. On
this latter question, we express no present opinion.
In December, 1980, the council promulgated revised ORCP 32,
governing class actions, and the revised rule is now before the legislature for
its consideration. The questions presented ask us whether some of the proposed
changes affect the substantive rights of the litigants, thereby exceeding the
council's authority, and if so, what effect this has on the validity of the
rule.
REVIEW OF LEGAL BASIS FOR DECISION
We do not write on a clean slate. In the abstract, the
determination whether a rule might "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right" of a litigant invites a journey into an uncharted bog of argument and
speculation. To articulate an analytical destinction between substance and
procedure is a most difficult task. However, the history of this language is
illuminating. This phraseology of ORS 1.735 is taken almost verbatim from the
Enabling Act of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 USC sec 2072.
No evidence of legislative history in Oregon demonstrates
convincingly that legislators themselves were aware of the origins of the
language, other than in an isolated expression of concern that the distinction
between substance and procedure was both a difficult and time-honored inquiry.
See remarks of Representative Frohnmayer, House Committee on
the Judiciary, February 24, 1977, tape 12, side 1 at 0953.
However, it is a universally accepted rule of statutory
construction that if one jurisdiction adopts the law of another, the
pre-existing judicial construction of the law in the jurisdiction of its origin
is persuasive, if not binding, authority on the later interpretation of the law
in the borrowing state. See University of Oregon Co-op Store v. Dept.
of Revenue, 273 Or 539, 542 P2d 900 (1975); Pacific Supply
Co-op v. State Tax Com., 224 Or 556, 356 P2d 939 (1960).530Our point of departure, then, is the stark conclusion that no
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure has yet been found by the United States Supreme
Court to "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive rights." C. Wright,
Federal Courts 294 (3d ed. 1976). The principles enunciated in
the cases cited for this proposition, id. at n 19 initiate our
central inquiry.
In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 US 1 (1941),
the Court upheld FRCP 35(a) which provided for an order requiring a litigant
whose condition was in question to submit to a physical or mental examination.
The Court said that it is not enough that a right affected is "important or
substantial" to bring it within the proviso that the rules regulating procedure
shall not "abridge, enlarge or modify substantive rights.""The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure,--the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of
them." 312 US at 14.In Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 US
438 (1946), the Court sustained FRCP 4(f). That rule provided for service of
process of a United States District Court anywhere in the state in which the
district was located, and not merely in the district. In the particular case,
other statutes and rules of substantive import gave venue to the Court. The
Court said:"Undoubtedly most alterations of the rules
of practice and procedure may and often do affect the rights of litigants.
Congress' prohibition of any alteration of substantive rights of litigants was
obviously not addressed to such incidental effects as necessarily attend the
adoption of the prescribed new rules of procedure upon the rights of litigants
who . . . have been brought before a court authorized to determine their
rights. [Citation omitted.] The fact that the application of Rule 4(f) will
operate to subject petitioner's rights to adjudication by the district court
for northern Mississippi will undoubtedly affect those rights. But it does not
operate to abridge, enlarge or modify the rules of decision by which that court
will adjudicate its rights. It relates merely to 'the manner and the means by
which a right to recover * * * is enforced.' [Citation omitted.] In this sense
the rule is a rule of procedure and not of substantive right, . . ." 326 US at
445-446.Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 US 427
(1956) and Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Co., 351 US 445
(1956), were both "multiple claims" actions, in which the Court was faced with
a challenge to the right to appeal a judgment on one or more but not all of the
claims, as permitted by FRCP 54(b) upon certification that there was no just
reason for delay and an express direction for the entry of judgment. The Court
sustained Rule 54(b), rejecting assertions that it violated 28 USC sec 1291
granting appellate jurisdiction only "from all final decisions
of the district courts . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
In the Cold Metal case, the "separate claim"
left unadjudicated was a "compulsory" counterclaim, i.e., a
counterclaim based in substantial part upon the same facts and circumstances as
the original claim. In a separate opinion concurring in the Sears
Roebuck case and dissenting in Cold Metal, Justice
Frankfurter agreed that Rule 54(b) was valid, stating that it did
not impair 28 USC sec 1291. The Cold Metal
counterclaim was simply an inseparable part of the litigation, he said, hence
sec 1291 prohibited...
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