Petrone v. Town of Ridgefield/Board of Education, 022720 CTWC, 6313 CRB-4-19-3

Case DateFebruary 27, 2020
CourtConnecticut
CHERYL PETRONE, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF MARLENE SAVIANO CLAIMANT-APPELLANT[1]
v.
TOWN OF RIDGEFIELD/BOARD OF EDUCATION EMPLOYER RESPONDENT-APPELLEE
No. 6313 CRB-4-19-3
Connecticut Workers Compensation
Compensation Review Board Workers Compensation Commission
February 27, 2020
         This Petition for Review from the February 19, 2019 Finding by Jodi Murray Gregg, the Commissioner acting for the Fourth District, was heard August 30, 2019 before a Compensation Review Board panel consisting of Commissioners Peter C. Mlynarczyk, David W. Schoolcraft and Daniel E. Dilzer.           The claimant was represented by Patrick W. Frazier, Esq.           The respondent was represented by Henry J. Zaccardi, Esq., Shipman & Goodman, LLP, *Attorney Zaccardi retired following oral argument and prior to the issuance of this Opinion. Attorney Christopher Neary, of Shipman & Goodman, LLP, filed a notice of appearance on January 16, 2020, appearing in lieu of Attorney Zaccardi.*          OPINION           PETER C. MLYNARCZYK, COMMISSIONER.          The claimant has appealed from a Finding (finding) which determined that the estate of the decedent was not entitled to any payments of life insurance benefits upon her death. The claimant argues that the respondent had not complied with General Statutes § 31-284b (a)[2] because, although the town was obligated to continue the decedent’s life insurance coverage while she collected compensation benefits, the life insurer from whom the town had purchased coverage declined to pay benefits upon her death because she was not a qualified insured. The respondent argues that by paying premiums for life insurance during the period that the decedent was alive and collecting workers’ compensation benefits, it complied with the terms of the statute and its responsibilities were discharged upon her death. The commissioner, Jodi Murray Gregg (commissioner), accepted the respondent’s interpretation of law and dismissed the claim. We conclude that this constitutes an erroneous interpretation of law and remand this matter for further proceedings.          The parties submitted stipulated facts to the commissioner so her decision turned exclusively on an interpretation of law. The facts stipulated to were as follows:
1. The deceased, Marlene Saviano, was an employee of the Ridgefield School District as a certified teacher on the date of injury, October 31, 1991.
2. As a certified teacher, Mrs. Saviano was a member of the teachers’ union bargaining unit.
3. As a member of the teachers’ union bargaining unit, the terms and conditions of Ms. Saviano’s employment were established through a collective bargaining agreement by the District and Teachers’ union.
4. The collective bargaining agreement included negotiated fringe benefits.
5. One fringe benefit the union negotiated with the District was life insurance that was paid for by the District.
6. The District paid premiums for this life insurance for all members of the teachers’ bargaining unit, including the decedent.
7. The District paid premiums on behalf of Mrs. Saviano through November, 2014.
8. Mrs. Saviano passed away on November 3, 2014.
9. On the date of injury, Mrs. Saviano as a full time teacher was within the class of employees the District was obligated to provide life insurance coverage for.
10. Cigna Group life insurance policy FLX-963147 was the agreement in effect for the Employer/ Respondent at the time of the Mrs. Saviano’s death.
Findings, ¶¶ 1-10.          Based on those stipulated facts, the commissioner concluded the decedent sustained a compensable injury in 1991while employed by the respondent and was receiving indemnity benefits from the date of her injury until her death on November 3, 2014. She cited § 31-284b (a) as governing this situation and found that the respondent paid all the life insurance premiums for the decedent until her death. The commissioner concluded that by paying life insurance premiums to the time of her death the employer had maintained her level of income during her lifetime. She further concluded that all of the town’s obligations to the employee ended upon her death, and that “any issues regarding the...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT