Scheftner v. Rio Linda School District, 100404 CAWC, SAC 0326274
Case Date | October 04, 2004 |
Court | California |
"This matter may be referred to the Disability Evaluation Unit. If a recommended rating issues, then the parties will have 7 days to file a motion to strike. If no motion is filed, the matter will then stand submitted. If it is not referred to the Disability Evaluation Unit, then it will be submitted as of today."The matter was not submitted to the Disability Evaluation Unit. Therefore, the matter was deemed ordered submitted as of February 18, 2004. On April 19, 2004, SB 899 was enacted. On April 23, 2004, the WCJ found, in relevant part, that Janelle Scheftner (applicant), sustained industrial injury to her low back on February 12, 2002, while employed as a teacher by defendant. The WCJ further found that the injury resulted in 34% permanent partial disability, without apportionment, and with a need for further medical treatment. In his Opinion on Decision, the WCJ explained that although applicant had problems with her back preexisting this injury, the employer was responsible for all disability "lit up" by the industrial injury and thus he did not apportion the disability. His decision was based in part on the medical opinion of Dr. Nijjar, applicant's Qualified Medical Evaluator. The WCJ arrived at the 34% permanent disability figure without consulting the Disability Evaluation Unit (DEU). On July 19, 2004, the Appeals Board granted the petition for reconsideration filed by Rio Linda Union Elementary (defendant). Defendant contends in substance: (1) that substantial evidence does not support the finding of 34% permanent partial disability; (2) that the WCJ erroneously relied on the medical opinion of Dr. Nijjar with regard to permanent disability because Dr. Nijjar did not comply with newly enacted Labor Code section 4663, effective April 19, 2004, that provides for apportionment based on causation; (3) that the WCJ incorrectly rated the factors of disability to arrive at the 34% figure, even if the subjective factors of disability described by Dr. Nijjar are to be accepted; and (4) that the award of future medical treatment by the WCJ is not supported by substantial evidence. In his Report and Recommendation on defendant's petition for reconsideration, the WCJ disagrees with defendant's contentions except, upon further reflection, the WCJ indicates that he probably should have called for a consultative rating by the Disability Evaluation Unit to rate the factors of disability described by Dr. Nijjar. He recommends that the matter be returned to him for this purpose only, but otherwise deny all other counts raised by defendant. As to the defendant's argument regarding the application of newly enacted Labor Code section 4663, the WCJ states that the change in the law enacted by SB 899, effective April 19, 2004, is not applicable to the instant case because the case had been submitted for decision as of February 18, 2004, a submission order existing prior to enactment of SB 899. DISCUSSION A. "Existing order, decision or award" includes orders of closure of discovery at mandatory settlement conferences and orders of submission for decision. The first issue here is whether the new statutes on apportionment, specifically section 4663,
"The amendment, addition, or repeal of, any provision of law made by this act shall apply prospectively from the date of enactment of this act, regardless of the date of injury, unless otherwise specified, but shall not constitute good cause to reopen or rescind, alter, or amend any existing order, decision, or award of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board."SB 899 repeals former statutes on apportionment contained in Labor Code sections 4663, 4750, and 4750.5, without a savings clause (see, 7 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Constitutional Law, §497, pp. 690-691). Substituted in place thereof are amended section 4663 and added section 4664, the former dealing with apportionment to causation with a requirement that physicians address apportionment to causation, and the latter including a conclusive presumption of a pre-existing disability if the applicant received a prior award of permanent disability. Neither section specifies an effective date other than the date of enactment of SB 899. However, Section 47 proscribes reopening of "any existing order, decision or award" to apply the new statutes. The question now arises as to what is meant by "existing order." In construing a statute, the Appeals Board's fundamental purpose is to determine and effectuate the Legislature's intent. (DuBois v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 382, 387 [58 Cal.Comp.Cases 286, 289]; Nickelsberg v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 288, 294 [56 Cal.Comp.Cases 476, 480]; Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [38 Cal.Comp.Cases 652, 657]; Cal. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd. (Karaiskos) 117 Cal.App.4th 350, 355 [69 Cal.Comp.Cases 183, 185].) Thus, the WCAB's first task is to look to the language of the statute itself. (Ibid.) The best indicator of legislative intent is the clear, unambiguous, and plain meaning of the statutory language. (DuBois v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 387-388 [58 Cal.Comp.Cases at p. 289]; Gaytan v...
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