Shannon, 111631 PAAGO, AGO 31

• Case Date: November 16, 1931
• Court: Pennsylvania

Honorable Edward C. Shannon AGO 31 Opinion No. 31 Pennsylvania Attorney General Opinions Opinion of the Attorney General November 16, 1931          Legislature—Extraordinary Session—Governor's Proclamation __ Constitutionality—Constitutionality of Senate Bills Nos. 1 to 19 inc.—Art. III, Sec. 25 and Art. IV, Sec. 12 of the Constitution.          The Governor's proclamation convening the General Assembly in special session and the supplemental proclamation adding to the list of subjects to be considered at the special session, are constitutional.          Constitutionality of Senate Bills Nos. 1 to 19 inclusive.          Honorable Edward C. Shannon,          President of the Senate,          Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.          Sir: I have before me a certified copy of Senator Salus's motion passed on Monday, November 9, requesting me to supply to the Senate, through you, my opinion as to the constitutionality of the Governor's call for the present Extraordinary Session, and of the bills introduced last week, and, from time to time, of bills presented hereafter during the Session. Subject to a reservation which I shall state at the conclusion of this communication, it gives me great pleasure to comply with the Senate's request.          The provisions of the Constitution dealing with Extraordinary Sessions of the General Assembly appear in Article IV, Section 12, and Article III, Section 25. They are:

Article IV, Section 12: "He [the Governor] may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the General Assembly, * * * He shall have power to convene the Senate in extraordinary session by proclamation for the transaction of executive business."

Article III, Section 25: " When the General Assembly shall be convened in special session, there shall be no legislation upon subjects other than those designated in the proclamation of the Governor calling such session."

         These constitutional provisions have been construed by our appellate courts in a number of cases; and it will be helpful, I am sure, to review these cases before dealing with the constitutionality either of the Governor's call or of the bills which have been introduced.          Pittsburgh's Petition, 217 Pa. 227, was decided in 1907, following the Special Session of the Legislature held in 1906.          Governor Penny packer called the Special Session by Proclamation dated November 11, 1905, to convene on January 15, 1906. In his proclamation, the Governor specified seven subjects which he asked the Legislature to consider. The first subject was:

"To enable contiguous cities in the same counties to be united in one municipality in order that the people may avoid the unnecessary burdens of maintaining separate city governments."

         On January 9, 1906, the Governor issued a second proclamation adding, four subjects to the list contained in the original proclamation. The fourth was as follows:

"To enable cities that are now or may hereafter be contiguous or in close proximity, including any intervening land, to be united in one municipality, in order that the people may avoid the unnecessary burdens of maintaining separate municipal governments. This fourth subject is a modification of the first subject in the original call, and is added in order that legislation may be enacted under either of them, as may be deemed wise."

         It will be noted that in this subject certain words of the first subject of the original call were omitted, and other words were added. The omitted words were "in the same counties." Among those added were, "or in close proximity, including any intervening land."          The Legislature passed the Act of February 7, 1906, P. L. 7, entitled, "An act to enable cities that are now, or may hereafter be, contiguous or in close proximity, to be united, with any intervening land other than boroughs, in one municipality; * * * "          Under this act the cities of Pittsburgh and Allegheny were consolidated by the Court of Quarter Sessions of Allegheny County. From the consolidation decree an appeal was taken to the Superior Court, and subsequently from that Court to the Supreme Court. Both appellate courts sustained the decree.          The first contention of the appellants was that the Act of 1906 was unconstitutional because it was not legislation upon a subject designated in the proclamation of the Governor calling the Special Session. The Supreme Court held that while the act did not come within subject "First" of the original proclamation, it did come within subject "Fourth" of the supplemental proclamation, and that the Governor's supplemental proclamation had validly enlarged the scope of legislative action at the Special Session.          In speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Brown said, at page 230;          "In the original proclamation the legislation to be considered by the general assembly on the subject of the consolidation of cities was confined to contiguous cities in the same county, and it may well be contended that, as the mandate of the constitution is imperative that the legislature, at the special session, shall pass no law upon any subject not designated in the call, the act is technically without it. The act is not for the consolidation of two contiguous cities, situated in the same county, but for that of any two, contiguous or in close proximity, wherever situated. They may be in different counties. We need not, however, pass upon the sufficiency of the first proclamation to sustain the act as being one of the subjects of legislation designated in it.          "Whether the general assembly ought to be called together in extraordinary...