Smith v. State, 091107 NEWC, 1426

Case DateSeptember 11, 2007
CourtNebraska
YVONNE SMITH, Plaintiff,
v.
THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, Defendant.
No. 1426
DOC 206
Nebraska Workers Compensation
September 11, 2007
          Joseph C. Dowding, Attorney at Law           Tracy L. Warren Assistant Attorney General           AWARD           John R. Hoffert, JUDGE          This cause came on for hearing before the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court at Lincoln, Lancaster County, Nebraska, on June 27, 2007, on the Petition of the plaintiff, Answer of the defendant and on the evidence, Judge John R. Hoffert, one of the judges of said court, presiding. Plaintiff appeared in person and was represented by counsel. Defendant was represented by counsel. Testimony was taken, evidence adduced, and cause submitted with receipt of briefs post-trial on August 7, 2007. The Court, having listened to the testimony presented at trial; having evaluated the exhibits introduced into evidence; having read the respective written submissions of counsel; and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, finds as follows.          I.          Prior to the presentation of oral testimony, the parties were able to reach several stipulations, to wit: (1) the plaintiff was employed by the defendant on the date of her alleged accident of January 25, 2006; (2) the plaintiff did, in fact, suffer an accident arising out of and in the course and scope of her employment with the defendant on January 25, 2006; (3) notice of said accident was given as soon as practicable by the plaintiff to the defendant following said accident; (4) plaintiff suffered a right thumb injury in said accident, but the remainder of plaintiff’s claimed injuries are in contest; (5) on the date of her accident the plaintiff earned an hourly rate of pay of $11.11 with an average weekly wage for purposes of the computation of temporary total and temporary partial disability benefits of $421.96; (6) the plaintiff was temporarily totally and temporarily partially disabled from January 25, 2006, through July 18, 2006, as set forth in paragraph III of Plaintiff’s Pre-Trial Memorandum which the parties agreed the Court could judicially notice (marked as Exhibit 34); (7) plaintiff received payment from the defendant of all temporary total and/or temporary partial disability benefits owed unto her for the time frame from January 25, 2006, through July 18, 2006; and, (8) that both venue and jurisdiction were proper. The Court accepts the stipulations of the parties and so finds.          The plaintiff offered into evidence Exhibits 1 through 20 and 32 through 33. [Exhibit 32 was offered and received into evidence post-trial as leave of Court to do so was extended so that plaintiff could rebut a medical report offered by the defendant, which had prompted an initial objection of untimely disclosure.] The defendant objected only to Exhibits 19 and 20, arguing that the depositions of Troy Reiners and Lisa Hoffman were irrelevant and did not constitute the best evidence. The Court overruled the objections based upon the understanding that the depositions would reduce or eliminate cumulative evidence as both witnesses were to be called at trial in any event. Hence, the Court received plaintiff’s Exhibits 1 through 20 and 32 through 33 into evidence.          The defendant, in turn, offered Exhibits 21 through 31 into evidence. The plaintiff objected only to Exhibit 26, pages 11 through 13 on the basis that the report of Dr. John Massey was not timely disclosed and thus served to prejudice plaintiff’s opportunity for rebuttal. As noted above, the Court, in lieu of striking said report, extended the opportunity to plaintiff to provide a report from her primary medical expert, Dr. Daniel Ripa, post-trial. Consequently, the Court received defendant’s Exhibits 21 through 31 into evidence as well. [Pursuant to the agreement of counsel, the Court reviewed the transcripts of the aforementioned depositions post-trial so as to rule upon any objections registered by either counsel. Having had the opportunity to review said transcripts, the Court hereby overrules all objections.]          II.          Owing to the stipulations entered into by the parties relative to plaintiff’s employment, occurrence of compensable accident, and the like, the first issue for the Court to resolve at trial is the matter of determining the full nature and extent of any injuries sustained by plaintiff. In other words, while the defendant has conceded that the plaintiff sustained a right thumb injury in the stipulated accident, plaintiff’s assertion that she suffered right carpal tunnel syndrome and resulting reflex sympathetic dystrophy or regional complex pain syndrome remained issues in dispute. Thus, they are matters for resolution by the Court. Each of the claimed injuries will be discussed, in turn.          With respect to the plaintiff’s claim that she suffered carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of her employment with defendant, the medical evidence is less than uniform as to not only diagnosis but cause. Each side has presented reports from various physicians who have offered diverse opinions on the subject. Thus, the Court is called upon to choose which of the experts to credit. While the Court acknowledges the legitimacy of the lament by several physicians that the plaintiff’s presentation (symptom and otherwise) was less than clear and consistent, the fact remains that the plaintiff was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome by objective testing. (The EMG and nerve conduction study revealing a mild to moderate degree of right distal median neuropathy) (E11). (Dr. Ripa also noted that an entrapped or constricted median nerve was evident at the time of surgery) (E13, p. 16).          In the end, the Court found the opinions of defendant’s examining expert, Dr. George L. Pratt and plaintiff’s operating surgeon, Dr. Daniel R. Ripa, to be persuasive on the issue of not only the diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome but also of the cause of plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome. In reaching this conclusion the Court is by no means satisfied that the syndrome was related in any manner to the singular discrete traumatic event occurring on January 25, 2006, when the plaintiff injured her thumb in her attempt to catch a falling box of files. Rather, the Court agrees with Drs. Pratt and Ripa that the carpal tunnel syndrome was "probably related to her long term (several years) hand/wrist/arm repetitive work activities. . . ." (E28, p. 14) (E13, p. 29). [At this juncture the Court would certainly note that one of defendant’s medical experts, Dr. D. M. Gammel, did suggest that plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome was the byproduct of her obesity and diabetic condition, but provided no persuasive analysis of the role of plaintiff’s obvious repetitive work activities in the development of her condition. This shortcoming led the Court to discount his opinion. Additionally, the Court acknowledges and shares the general sense of the medical evidence (considered as a whole) that the interplay of plaintiff’s subjective presentation relative to her thumb injury and right extremity complaints was confusing or otherwise clouded any attempt to segregate the two. Yet, several medical experts were able to sort through the perplexity presented. Finally, the Court would observe that while it has not found that the plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome was the result of the accident sued upon, no due process concerns are evident as the defendant certainly was aware of the claim for the condition as well as the medical evidence generated by plaintiff in the preparation of her case. Indeed, the defendant was quite vigorous in its defense of this claimed injury and mounted a spirited medical rebuttal to same.]          In finding that the plaintiff has established that her carpal tunnel syndrome was related to her work activities for defendant, the Court obviously has concluded that Ms. Smith has satisfied the three elements necessary to establish that her repetitive work activities met the statutory definition of "accident" as set forth in Nebraska Revised Statutes § 48-151(2). In other words, the Court finds that the plaintiff’s injury was unexpected or unforeseen; happened suddenly and violently; and produced objective symptoms of injury.          The medical records generated contemporaneously with the events under review served to support or satisfy the "unexpected or...

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